LUKE AND LONERGAN

AND INTERIORITY:

“PAY ATTENTION TO HOW YOU LISTEN” (LUKE 8:18)

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LUKE AND LONERGAN AND INTERIORITY: “PAY ATTENTION TO HOW YOU LISTEN” (LUKE 8:18)¹

1. INTRODUCTION & THESIS

In this study, I present an insight or hypothesis regarding Luke, the Third Evangelist, engendered by studying Bernard Lonergan’s *Method in Theology* and by having familiarized myself with his thought on human interiority, i.e., with his thematizing of the operations of the human subject, and with his set of terms and relations for understanding and discoursing on human interiority, i.e., subjectivity.² The object about which I am seeking greater understanding is not the Third Gospel, but Luke, its author, as a human subject.³

The observation that engendered this particular interest is that in Luke’s gospel account one encounters recurrent and redactional reference to the mental acts of characters. I present the following thesis: Luke had a common sense understanding of the world of interior acts to the level of attending to the operation of self-appropriation as relevant to the mental acts of believing.⁴ In order to establish the thesis of this paper, I shall compare to Lonergan’s

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¹ I must thank Prof. Michael Vertin for his advice and encouragement as I wrote this paper.
² Lonergan uses the term interiority at times in a sense that covers all interior, subjective operations; however, his term “realm of interiority” is technical. Lonergan remarked to the effect that interiority is subjectivity as illustrated by the spiritual life, by what is prior to the objectification of spiritual life that mediates the very experience in order to understand it; e.g., the objectification of interiority in the definition of compunction as distinct from the prior feeling compunction. That prior reality is “what counts”, the subject, the interior self as present to the self. Interiority is the fundamental, immediate, given element of subjectivity. Cf. Bernard Lonergan, *Early Works on Theological Method 1*, Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan, vol. 22; gen. eds. Frederick E. Crowe & Robert M. Doran; eds. Robert M. Doran & Robert C. Croken; Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2010; 268 and 287.
⁴ Lonergan in an excursus added to his work, *The Triune God: Doctrines* (Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan 11; Eds. Robert M. Doran and H. Daniel Monsour; transl. Michael Shields; Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2009, 639-685) anticipated the kind of study I attempt in this paper. He wrote in reference to implicit (actus exercitatus) interiority in the New Testament hagiographers the need for exeges to thematize (actus signatus) the presence of that psychological reality behind what the sacred writers expressed. His general concern is continuity in the development of doctrine and in the correlate transposition from one pattern of experience to another (*Early Works on Theological Method 1*, 277; cf. as well *Method in Theology*, 351-353); his particular concern as he wrote in *The Triune God: Doctrines* was the possibility of thematizing what might be implicit in the New Testament in the regard of the development later of the doctrine of the psychological analogy. The ground for his remarks he placed in what
thematized and philosophical account of mental acts Luke’s portrayal of the human interior acts of some of the *personae* in his recounting of the gospel story, especially in his narrations relevant to the interior operations of believing.⁵

Operative in the argumentation for my thesis are three streams of thematizing. The first is that of Lonergan. He describes his study of understanding as thematizing it, i.e., “picking out some element and starting to think about that, asking questions about that”.⁶ It brings out what is implicit in experience and makes it explicit by thinking about it and asking questions about it; it is a transition from doing something to making it an object of consideration.⁷ Pervasive in this study is reference to Lonergan’s thematizing of interior operations. Lonergan clarified thinking on interiority by proposing not only his understanding of mental or interior acts but also by creating to some extent a history of thinking on cognitive process because in formulating his thought on the matter he has treated Augustine’s, Aquinas’, Scotus’, Kant’s, Hume’s and other

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⁶ *Early Works on Theological Method*, 15; cf. also, 157, 162, 184-185, 339-341. Lonergan (*Early Works on Theological Method 3*, 134) teaches that one function of transcendental method is that “it makes explicit and thematized what otherwise remains implicit and experienced only”. Lonergan (Ibid., 7) observes that the systematic thematizing of the interior experience of understanding is the matter of his book *Insight: A Study of Human Understanding* and historical thematizing of understanding which is the matter of his book *Verbum: Word and Idea in Aquinas* (Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan, vol. 2; eds. Frederick E. Crowe & Robert M. Doran; Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1997).

thinkers’ thinking on interior operations. Moreover, Lonergan gave us an explanatory account of differences in thought on cognitive process. In fine, through the mediation of Lonergan’s work one result of this study may be an initial locating of Luke’s narrative thematizing of interior acts within the historical stream of thinking on thinking.  

A second stream of thematizing is mine. I shall be selecting and focusing on passages from the Third Gospel and presenting them as data in order to evince the recurrent and redactional presence in Luke’s discourse of the mention of interior acts (the functional specialty of research). I ask what do these components of the text say about the author. My thematizing is what a student of a text may do in order to understand a recurrent element operative in the text. It is a process that selects and highlights recurrent structures and asks questions about them. The other stream of thematizing belongs to Luke as an author. Do the data indicate that Luke is making interior acts a literary motif in his narrative recounting of the gospel story and, if so,  

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8 Ibid., 287-288 speaks of understanding the “structure of the operator” as aiding one to understand the “structure of the operata”, and that in turn can aid locating thinkers (writers) for it gives a “principle of criticism” to deal with the “historical process of a literature and a doctrine.”

9 I present here one passage of many in which Lonergan reasons why and how later developments can shed light on the past and bring out things not before appreciated: “There are several ways in which subsequent events throw light upon what went before. Consequently, there is to history what is called the perspective. In the perspective that arises at a certain moment, subsequent to the past that is being investigated, there is a whole new slice of that part of history that comes to light that before just was not perceptible. … But what is known by contemporary common sense is not everything that enters into history. Churchill was magnificently placed to know everything that was going on in the Second World War. He had one of the positions of privilege. But his history of the Second World War is not the last word in the history of the business. History stands to what is known by contemporary common sense pretty much as self-knowledge stands to consciousness. All our waking moments are conscious, and everything we do during them is conscious. But that does not mean that we know ourselves. Similarly, the man who knows what is going on in his time is knowing what can be known by contemporary common sense, but history is concerned with more than that. And that ‘more than that’ is not relatively fixed but the relatively fluid element in history. It is what is brought to light subsequently. You can write the history of the battle after the battle is over and you know who won. … There are, then, new perspectives that arise in history by the passage of time, by subsequent events and subsequent understanding. … By subsequent developments in human science, in archeology, in knowledge of languages and various things of that type, there is in the course of time an opening up of new perspectives on the past” (Early Works on Theological Method 1, 247-248).

what does it mean (the functional specialty of interpretation)?\textsuperscript{11} In this last instance, i.e., in Luke’s thematizing, I am interested in the meaning of what he is doing as a religious author; I am not in this paper focussing on the meaning of the content of what he composed.

In referencing what can be discovered in Luke’s writings on interior acts to Lonergan’s philosophic account of them, I exercise what Lonergan calls the functional specialty of history.\textsuperscript{12} What was going forward in Luke’s thinking on mental acts as compared to that of some others who focus on interior acts and religion? This last step puts Luke into a larger context by comparing his mind to another’s; and that is a movement toward historical understanding. As Lonergan observes in effect, to put a single author and her work (a hermeneutic context that has the unity of working with a single mind) into a larger whole by comparing her thought to that of others (an historical context having the interplay of several minds) is to move from interpretation to history.\textsuperscript{13}

My procedure will be, first, to give a word about Lonergan on mental acts, interiority, self-appropriation and transcendental method; then, second, present Lonergan’s account on the subjectivity of believing. I survey, third, major instances of Luke’s attention to the mental acts of the \textit{personae} of the gospel story in order to evince an intentional thematizing of interior operations, in other words, to show that Luke has thought about thinking and inculcated it in his narrative. Fourth, I show that Luke has thought about thinking enough to describe interior operations, and I present Luke’s sense of a relation between believing and self-appropriation to demonstrate the level of his understanding of the interiority of believing. Last, in an appendix, I will present a correspondence at play in this study between an aspect of the thought of Lonergan

\textsuperscript{11} Ibid., 127; 153-173.
\textsuperscript{12} Ibid., 128; 175-196.
on exegesis and that of H. J. Cadbury, a Lucan scholar in the early part of the last century, something to be exploited for further exegesis of Luke-Acts as a result of this study; that correspondence is the hermeneutic value of understanding the author and not just the text.

I shall propose that in so far as Luke portrays the mental acts of certain *personae* of the narrative, he was in effect re-characterizing them differently from what his sources had done. However, in this paper, I will not enlarge on that topic, for it is the matter of a larger study.

Since one may find in the writings of any author elements of interiority being portrayed, I must evince from the text of the Third Gospel evidence that the author intentionally portrayed interiority and that mention of interior acts, as found in the Gospel of Luke, is not a part of the received story. In order to do this, I look for what is unique to but typical (recurrent) of Luke, what Cadbury called a Lucan tendency.\(^\text{14}\) My criteria for discerning a Lucan intentional tendency are components of the text that are recurrent, that are a matter of the author’s discourse and that are phenomena owing to his redaction of sources.\(^\text{15}\) As to establishing redactional activity on Luke’s part we have his literary relation to Matthew and to Mark as a control. The synoptic view of these three gospels affords us the advantage of comparing data from his text to the parallel passages in his sources in order to isolate what is both unique and typical (recurrent) of his recounting of the same narrative material. Those typical features in turn can be interpreted to give us information about Luke the person. The data to be mined will be about his interests and tendencies as distinct from his sources.\(^\text{16}\)

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\(^\text{16}\) See the appendix.
For the most part, I will confine this study to the use of information gathered from the Third Gospel. There is, I believe, sufficient data in the Third Gospel alone to make the case for my thesis. I shall use the Revised Standard Version (hereafter, RSV) translation of the Greek texts, unless I indicate otherwise. I am assuming as a well established consensus of scholarship that the Third Gospel and the Acts of the Apostles have the same author. I assume throughout this study also the validity of the modified two source theory of synoptic relations.

2. LONERGAN ON MENTAL ACTS, INTERIORITY, SELF-APPROPRIATION & TRANSCENDENTAL METHOD

Certain terms involved in my thesis refer to specific elements of Lonergan’s system; they are, namely mental acts, interiority, self-appropriation and transcendental method. As an aid and a quick review for my reader I will give below a summary meaning of those terms in his system.

For Lonergan, mental acts are the interior operations of the human subject; namely, “seeing, hearing, touching, smelling, tasting, inquiring, imagining, understanding, conceiving, formulating, reflecting, marshalling and weighing the evidence, judging, deliberating, evaluating, deciding, speaking writing.” These operations or acts are recurrent and related and also intend in a psychological sense objects, i.e., “by seeing there becomes present (to the one looking) what is seen.” Each operation has a subject (an operator) and an object. The presence spoken of here is a psychological event.

Interiority then is the world wherein mental acts are experienced and systematically conceived. Interiority is one of the four realms of meaning. For the most part, the two

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17 I shall use the siglum LXX when referring to the Septuagint Version of the Hebrews Scriptures.
19 Ibid., 7.
20 Ibid., 261.
21 Ibid., 81-85, 120, 257-62, 272, 286.
worlds of meaning which concern us here are the realms of common sense and that of interiority. The former “is the realm of persons and things in their relations to us.” The latter, Lonergan held, is the realm “… where language speaks indeed of the subject and his operations as objects but, none the less, rests upon a self-appropriation that has verified in personal experience the operator, the operations, and the processes referred to in the basic terms and relations of the language employed.” This definition of interiority is, of course, a philosophic, systematic one, and there is a very high probability that as a realm of meaning it might have been beyond the level of Luke to have been able to formulate in his mind and to have practiced methodically in reference to the patterns of experience. Lonergan has commented on past thinkers whose

22 Ibid., 81. In answering a question as we find transcribed in Understanding and Being (Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan, vol. 5; eds. Elizabeth A. and Mark D. Morelli; Toronto: University of Toronto press, 1980; 265) Lonergan remarks that “self-appropriation as relevant to philosophy is in the intellectual pattern of experience…” Belonging to which pattern of experience might Lonergan have considered self-appropriation as relevant to believing? Perhaps, it might have been the dramatic-practical pattern. But how can the dramatic-practical pattern of experience become an arena of operations of the realm of interiority? In one of the discussion periods reported in Understanding and Being (Discussion 3, p. 329) Lonergan remarked, “To be in the dramatic pattern of experience is to be not thinking about it.” Lonergan’s statement that interiority is subjectivity and the following passages in Lonergan’s writings lead me to conjecture that elements of the realm of interiority can be operative in the world of common sense and in the dramatic-practical pattern of experience. “True religion adds to explicit metaphysics. The latter is, in the intellectual pattern of experience, detached (not as spectator but as actor intending truth). It contemplates things in relation to one another. There is no emphasis on self. Religion takes man as he is in the concrete dramatic-practical pattern and transforms, purifies, liberates, elevates him to a concrete dramatic-practical pattern congruous with the intellectual pattern. … Charity as love of God above all leads to detachment, and as love of neighbor as oneself it leads to objectivity. As transforming, purifying, liberating, and elevating, it is a process. Perfect charity is always a goal. As a process it has special reference to self: humility, abasement, sorrow, detestation, purpose of amendment, hope, confidence, faith, ‘I’ coram Deo with my neighbor in the world: Mitvollzug” (Cf. Bernard Lonergan, S. J., “Editorial Report on the Handwritten Notes for “De Systemate et Historia,” Early Works on Theological Method 2, Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan, vol. 23; gen. eds. Frederick E. Crowe & Robert M. Doran; eds. Robert M. Doran & H. Daniel Monsour; transl Michael G. Shields; Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2013, 322-323). In Lonergan’s work Topics in Education (Collected Works of Berhard Lonergan, vol. 10, eds. Robert M. Doran & Frederick E. Crowe; Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1993; 91) one finds the following passage which leads me to speculate that Lonergan might have considered self-appropriation as relevant to believing to be in the practical pattern of experience; “The intellectual pattern of experience that corresponds to the universe of being is beyond any particular horizon. … To move into the practical pattern of experience without contracting one’s horizon presupposes perfect charity. There is an intimate correlation between the natural and the supernatural, according to the doctrine of St. Thomas. … Thus the pure desire to know includes in its range the supernatural goal to which de facto we are destined in this life. … Thus it is by charity that we can move into the practical pattern of experience without contracting our horizon.” For Lonergan’s thought on patterns of consciousness or of experience see chapter six of Insight: A Study of Human Understanding (Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan vol. 3; eds., Frederick E. Crowe & Robert M. Doran; Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1992); as well, see Topics in Education, 188.

23 Lonergan, Method in Theology, 257; cf. as well 9, 14-20. If there were no objectification of interior operations, there could be no discussion of them; see in this regard Lonergan (Early Works on Theological Method 1, 287).
language expresses mental acts. He observed that Thomas Aquinas, complementing Aristotle’s thought, worked out an account of mental acts in the theoretic, intellectual realm of meaning.\(^\text{24}\)

On the other hand, although Augustine’s, Descartes’, Pascal’s and Newman’s thought on thinking remains “within the world of common sense apprehension and speech” still they “contribute enormously to our understanding of ourselves.”\(^\text{25}\) My thesis would place Luke among these last, and open the possibility that, in the common sense world of meaning and the dramatic and practical patterns of experience as relevant to believing, some elements of methodical interiority might well have been operative in Luke as a subject-operator, most especially, what Lonergan indicated as self-appropriation.\(^\text{26}\)

A key component, a foundational operation, of method, which is Lonergan’s philosophy, is self-appropriation. The method depends on one’s presence to oneself and is “a matter of heightening consciousness by objectifying it and that is something each one, ultimately, has to do in himself and for himself.”\(^\text{27}\) “It is a matter of applying the operations as intentional to the operations as conscious.”\(^\text{28}\) Self-appropriation as a heightening of consciousness “reveals not the subject as object but the subject as subject.”\(^\text{29}\) To paraphrase Lonergan, what counts in self-appropriation is the looker in the act of looking and not the seen, the listener in the act of listening and not the heard.

For Lonergan, “self-appropriation of itself is a grasp of transcendental method” and “the appropriation of one’s own interiority, one’s subjectivity, one’s operations, their structures, their norms, their potentialities… is a heightening of intentional consciousness, an attending not

\(^{25}\) Ibid., 261.
\(^{26}\) Cf. note 7 above.
\(^{27}\) Ibid., 14.
\(^{28}\) Ibid.
\(^{29}\) Ibid., 262.
merely to objects but also to the intending subject and his acts”. 30 Lonergan teaches that transcendental method rests on self appropriation; i.e., “on attending to, inquiring about, understanding, conceiving, affirming one’s attending, inquiring, understanding, conceiving, …”31 Lonergan’s method “is simply reason’s explicit consciousness of the norms of its own procedures ….32 It is the critical tool of the interior realm of meaning addressing the need for critical analysis of the first two realms of meaning, the common sense and the theoretical, which are realms first and foremost of knowing.33 Hence, the critical question, “What am I doing when I am knowing” is answered by a method Lonergan calls transcendental, i.e., a method applying to all knowers for it is transcultural and invariant from knower to knower. Important for my presentation of Luke’s grasp of interiority is the following remark made by Lonergan; namely, “in a sense everyone knows and observes transcendental method.”34 It was possible that Luke could have practiced self-appropriation without a theoretic knowledge of method. I must show that Luke attended to the operations of the subject with a critical intent and to the subject as responsible for her/his own subjective acts, and thus in kernel, in an elementary way, and in reference to the acts of believing had some idea of transcendental method.

Lonergan observes that this same heightening of consciousness that reveals the subject as subject does proceed:

“to an objectification of the subject…to a transition from the subject as subject to the subject as object. Such transition yields objective knowledge of the subject just as

30 Ibid., 83.
31 Ibid., 34, footnote 6. Lonergan here likened self-appropriation to therapy which he saw as “an appropriation of one’s own feelings”.
33 Lonergan, Method, 83.
34 Ibid., 14.
much as does any valid transition from the data of sense through inquiry and understanding, reflection and judgment.”

How can I compare evidence of Luke’s thinking to that of Lonergan’s idea of method? I can do so because of Lonergan’s account of the interior process of coming to believe establishes what is normative for that process of human intentional acts. Lonergan evinces the transcendental character of the basic patterns of intentional consciousness; those operations are the “rock” of all particular methodical procedures applied to any subject matter. Lonergan held that the patterns of intentional operations, both natural cognitive and faith cognitive operations, are a given and any attempt to revise them would involve the very same operations one is attempting to revise, “so that a revision rejecting the pattern would be rejecting itself.”

Lonergan writes: “There is then a rock on which one can build. …. The rock, then, is the subject in his conscious, unobjectified attentiveness, intelligence, reasonableness, responsibility.”

Lonergan has in his philosophy objectified those givens of intentional consciousness.

3. LONERGAN ON THE INTERIORITY OF BELIEVING

Lonergan has objectified the intentional operations of the process of coming to believe. The intentionality of believing as that of imminently generated knowledge is transcendental in that its pattern is operative in all human subjects, whether the object of faith treats of something that a teacher is telling a student (natural faith) or whether it treats of what someone says that God has said or has willed (supernatural faith).

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35 Ibid., 262.
36 Ibid., 19.
37 Ibid., 19-20.
38 Ibid.
39 Ibid., 44-46; see as well Early Works on Theological Method I, 326-338.
The result of introducing divine faith is that it gives us a new interiority. ...

Interiority is not merely a matter of what you experience, understand, and judge in virtue of your experience and understanding. ... It is also a matter of what you believe, the interiority of the act of faith. ... And that believing interiority is the source of method in theology and in reflection on community.40

The light of faith as Lonergan expresses it regards the question “is it so”, “did it happen”, “is it real” (an sit).41 This question is the concern of the reflective act of understanding. The proceeding judgment from the reflective act of understanding in the case of believing is generated by a decision, a choice, as opposed to being generated by grasp of the sufficiency of the evidence as in imminently generated knowledge.42 Hence, whereas in the reasoning process of imminently generated knowledge, the act of understanding the intelligibility of what is presented to intelligence precedes the reflective act of understanding which grounds the judgment that “x” is true, in the believing process, on the other hand, the reflective act of understanding precedes a possible act of understanding the intelligibility of the information humanly or divinely revealed. The light of intelligence which tries to understand concerns itself in matters of religious faith with what do the revelations or the mysteries mean (quid sit).43

Lonergan, then, distinguished the interiority of believing from the interiority of imminently generated knowledge; however, the distinction is had not in the nature of the interior operations involved but in their relation to one another.

40 Lonergan, Early Works on Theological Method 1, 150-155.
41 Ibid., 286.
42 Lonergan remarks on the order among the levels of consciousness as first empirical consciousness, then intellectual, then rational and then moral. However, he goes on to observe, "This ... describes the natural order -- which, in a way, is reversible, since God by the infusion of supernatural graces can and usually does affect the will more than the intellect and the intellect more than the senses" (The Ontological and Psychological Constitution of Christ, Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan 7; Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2005; 187).
43 Ibid.
At this point, we may recall the five steps in coming to believe as Lonergan indicated.44 One, the faith process is possible because truth is not private but public, independent of the mind and so communicable. Two, there is the general judgment of value that accepts the division of labor in gaining knowledge. We need to depend on others for most of our knowledge, including religious knowledge. Three, there is a particular judgment of value as to the trustworthiness of the source of knowledge or information. Four, there is the decision to believe, a choice, that follows on the general and the particular judgments of value, a judgment of credibility (possibility) and credentity (value) i.e., I can (credibility) and should (credentity) believe, and like all judgments depends on a grasp of the virtually unconditioned which proceeds from a reflective act of understanding.45 The act of belief of a man or woman of good will follows naturally from the decision to believe.46 And so, five, there is the act of believing; I judge to be true the communicated fact or value. As Lonergan says, the “key act in the process of coming to believe is the reflective act of understanding” which is in the case of believing is a judgment of value that precedes the act of choosing to believe.47 One decides to believe that “x” is true because one can and ought to believe it.48

44 The five steps can be found in Method in Theology, 44-46; cf. as well Early Works on Theological Method 1, 326-338.
45 Ibid., 141-50; 327 (Here Lonergan enlarges on the freedom of the act of faith).
46 Ibid. I would suspect, that the procession of the act of faith from the decision to believe may be what Lonergan calls a processio operationis, “the emergence of a perfection from (and in) what is perfected”; for Lonergan with St. Thomas, in his faculty psychology, holds that there is in the will no processio operati (Verbum: Word and Idea in Aquinas, 17; 107; 205-213); cf. also Lonergan’s The Triune God: Systematics, Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan 12; Eds. Robert M. Doran and Daniel Monsour; transl. Michael Shields; Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2007, 223.
47 Lonergan, Early Works on Theological Method 1, 326-338.
48 As to the relation among the virtue of faith, the reflective act of understanding, the judgment and the act of deciding or choosing, Lonergan’s notes printed as the appendix to his study of verbum in St. Thomas (Verbum: Word and Idea in Aquinas, 230-52) may be helpful as an ulterior elucidation. Concerning the reflective act of understanding he writes, “To grasp a necessary nexus between the evidence, on the one hand, and the projected judgment, on the other, is to understand” (Verbum, 241).” As to the point of insertion of faith in the process of coming to believe, Lonergan writes: “The virtues (wisdom and prudence) regard judging as an active resoluto in principia and not as the passive reception of a verbum. One might say that there is a virtue of intellectual honesty, of submitting readily to what one sees must be so; such a virtue would regard not the act whence judgment proceeds but the reception of the act that is judgment itself; but most probably its subject would be not intelligence but the act
Lonergan makes very clear that one does not believe by relying on one’s own understanding, i.e., by attempting to answer the quid sit questions, e.g., “what does it mean” or “what is it”. On the contrary, one first assents to the knowledge that comes from someone else’s mind; then, one asks what it might mean. Lonergan affirms that our Christian faith is based not on our knowledge of God’s knowledge, but on God’s knowledge of God’s knowledge. The light of faith only illumines the mind to settle an sit questions, “is it” or “is it so”. The natural light of intelligence is given a further light by faith in order to assent. When believers and believing theologians seek to answer the quid sit questions concerning the objects of faith, concerning “what do you mean when you talk about the supernatural,” a believer “gets no new species of the supernatural order; he begins from ex analogiae eorum quae naturaliter cognoscit.” “While the truths of faith are beyond the range of natural human knowledge, the truths of faith are not beyond the capacity of the human intelligence because human intelligence is supernaturally elevated and human intelligence assents to them.”

4. LUKE: MENTAL ACTS & SUBJECTIVITY


I begin my exploration of Luke’s attention to interior acts with an illustration taken from the prologue to the Third Gospel (Luke 1:1-4). At the very beginning of the narrative, the

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49 Lonergan, Early Works on Theological Method I, 183.
50 Ibid., 286-287.
51 Ibid., 286; see also Method in Theology, 336.
52 Lonergan, Early Works on Theological Method I, 286-287.
author tells his reader about some of the interior workings that led him to write his account of Jesus. To Luke, his gospel is the product of a series of related interior operations. In the language of Lonergan, in recounting that interior process, Luke objectified his subjective operations, and in doing so, Luke made accessible to others some things about his own interiority of believing and of thinking. I shall interpret Luke to have been a believer with an active intelligence in the regard of his beliefs. Below I present first data from the text.

In Luke 1:1-2, the author presents himself as a believer in the things God has accomplished, for the object of his interior operations has to do with what God has done (peplhroforhme, nwn, 1:1). As to knowledge of what God has done, he studies trustworthy authorities, eyewitnesses from the beginning (1:2).

As to Luke’s reasoning at work, he related to us how he followed closely, or traced or investigated (parhkolouqhko, ti, 1:3) his sources. Moreover, he describes his interior effort of studying as having been done carefully (avkribw/j) and for a long time (a;nwqen). The descriptive verb, “follow closely or trace” along with the two adverbial qualifiers clearly indicate Luke’s attention to the effort of his mental acts of study. In verse three, Luke is remembering his attending to the object and to the quality of the intending. We see that Luke tried to understand what his sources meant and to comprehend what he had by faith already assented to.

As a result of his investigation, Luke tells us that he had decided to write a narrative to which he would give an ordering (kaqexh/j, Luke 1:3), thereby suggesting that he had had some insight(s) possibly gained from correlating his various sources. The “ordering” might have

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54 The role God plays in Luke’s double opus justifies the interpretation of this Greek perfect passive participle in Luke 1:1, peplhroforhme, nwn (accomplished), as a theological passive. God is Luke’s main actant, agent or character. He is even mentioned more times than is Jesus and is suggested by numerous theological passives. Although God never appears on stage as it were, I see God as a real character in Luke’s narratives, for His voice is heard; we are told how He feels, what He wills etc. For an opposite view of God as a character in Luke-Acts, see J. D. Kingsbury, Conflict in Luke. Jesus, Authorities, Disciples. Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1991, 11-13.
meant to Luke “starting at the beginning,” a meaning for this word which he uses elsewhere in his narratives; however, Luke’s chronology of events is not the same as his Marcan source, and the meaning he gives to some events is not the same.55 An example of change in chronological order and in meaning is Luke 7:36-50, The Woman Who Anoints Jesus. Possibly Luke was making sense out of differences in his sources. His insight(s) and judgments would have grounded the order that he would present as the base for the surety he wanted to give Theophilus. Whether or not Luke attended to his experience of his acts of insight, we can none the less read out of Luke’s narratives that he had many. In any case, Luke came to a decision (e; doxe kamoï, 1:3; cf. as well Acts 15:22, 25, 28) to write a new ordered account (kaqexh/j, 1:3). Here we see Luke’s memory not only of his interior intellectual and his rational activity about what he believed but also of his decision-making and the execution of that decision. Luke’s faith mediated to him the reality of what eyewitnesses say God has done in Jesus, and his faith led him to appropriate the truth and value offered (Luke 1:1-2) as well as to decide to act for the good of another by ordering in some way what his sources said (Luke 1:3-4).

In these verses, Luke objectified his past interior workings in a common sense realm of meaning. He is not presenting his interior workings as both experienced and systematically conceived, i.e., Lonergan’s realm of interiority, his third realm of meaning. We infer that he was a believer, that his mind worked over the narratives of others available to him and that something interior occurred that made him want for the good of another to write a new account with a certain “order” that he would give. Thus, Luke told us of his intending an ordering element owing to and correlative to, a result of, his study of sources. In addition to Luke’s attending to

his interior experience, he objectified a component of his interior act of judgment of which he was aware by memory, by use of the words “it seemed good to me,” words here that describe his decision making. In summary then, Luke relates his interior process: after having traced (studied) everything carefully for some time (Greek perfect active participle), I decided (“it seemed good to me”) to write an ordered account that would help you, Theophilus.

Let us now review Luke 1:1-4 referencing these verses to Bernard Lonergan’s thought in relation to the five steps in the process of coming to believe.

Luke must have judged the knowledge of others to be a good for him and for others (Lonergan’s steps 1, 2 and 3). The mediation of his faith is that he accepted as good, as an intellectual value, what his sources say God has done in Jesus. Such knowledge Luke had not generated of himself by reflecting on his own religious experience; it was someone else’s knowledge that Luke had judged by the light of faith with more or less awareness to be a good thing for him to know, and so was choosing to believe (Lonergan’s steps 4 & 5). Here is implicit Luke’s reflective act of understanding. I supply that act from Lonergan’s account of the interior process of coming to believe as inculcating what is normative for that process of human intentional acts. Luke gives us enough information about his intentional acts in 1:2 that as a result I can supply from Lonergan’s description of the normative process of believing what Luke did not objectify for his reader or of what he might even have been unaware. Since he tells us that he held to what eyewitnesses handed on (Lonergan’s step 3), he had to have made some judgment of value in order to believe them, judgment not owing to his understanding the full meaning of what he has accepted, for he felt that there was yet something to learn in the study of

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56 Early Works on Theological Method 1, 96-97. As to the role of the light of faith in believing, Lonergan wrote: “… the light of faith, in the sense in which the light of the faith is the light involved in the reflective act of understanding grounding the judgment of credibility and credentity, is the per se pivot in the genesis of the divine faith. It is the point at which there is effected per se the transition from a natural to a supernatural order” (Ibid., 147-148).
his sources in which he believed (Luke 1:3). In this verse, we may see at play in Luke as subject-operator using his intelligence and making decisions as to what he believed. His careful tracing of his sources implies some attempt to understand what he believed. We do not have sufficient reason in these verses to affirm that Luke theorized as did Lonergan on the believing process with some systematic set of terms and relations; none the less, Luke’s description of his interior process which resulted in his writing another account of the gospel story reveals that he was aware of and attended to his interior acts as a believer in the God of Israel.

We may discern in Luke 1:1-4 interplay of the prior light of faith and of personal assent and believing on the one hand and on the other of the subsequent power of reasoning that seeks to understand the mysteries.57 We can see from our historical vantage point that Luke operated with faith and active intelligence by the manner in which he recounts in his prologue how he was led to write his account of the gospel story. Luke reported these interior acts of believing and understanding as if to say that it was for him a most natural way for such things to go for a believer. As I will continue to show, Luke was aware of the need for a believer to try to understand, and he made a literary motif of trying to understand what related to God.

Luke 1:1-4 shows that the Third Evangelist tried to understand what he believed and that he must have had insights about the material in his sources, for we find in Luke-Acts religious meaning(s) not found in his known sources.58 He created new narrative motifs and replayed

57 See Bernard Lonergan, S. J., (The Ontological and Psychological Constitution of Christ, 87) for a concise account of his position on the relation of faith to reason. One recalls here how often Lonergan in his writings on the relation of faith to reason quotes from Vatican I, Dei filius, the formula ratio per fidem illustrata (Chapter 4, “De Fide et Ratione”; cf. also, Method, 323; 335; DS 3016.

58 E.g., Luke 7:36-50, The Woman with the Ointment, found in all four gospels, is not told in relation to Jesus’ burial as in the other three gospels, and it is not placed in the narrative in proximity to Jesus’ passion. Cf. Matt 26:6-13; Mark 14:3-9; John 12:1-7.
motifs from the LXX. The Third Evangelist operated under the assumption that he could understand religious knowledge which he did not generate of his own religious experience. How Luke presented himself trying to understand what he believed God to have done is consonant with Lonergan’s explication of the order of the interior operations of coming to believe and seeking to understand the revealed mysteries. Luke’s is not as is Lonergan’s a theoretical-philosophical rendering of the interiority of his own believing, i.e., one that relates the operations one to the other systematically in explanatory fashion; his is, none the less, that of a person in touch in a common sense way with his experience of his own believing. Luke here showed consciousness of his interior operations although he might not have had a meta-language, as for example a grammar and syntax are for a language, as a set of terms for those operations and a clear grasp of the relations of those operations one to the other. Lonergan taught that divine revelation was in terms of the common sense world, as is faith; Luke, in fact, dealt in a common sense fashion with what to him was divine revelation.

In addition to the interiority of believing, to that prior reality behind that which Luke narrated as mental acts, discernible in Luke 1:1-4 through Lonergan’s thematizing of conscious intentionality, we may recognize also the four levels of conscious intentionality operative in the Third Evangelist by his affirmations in 1:1-4 about himself. We can see at work his natural conscious interiority in that Luke has understood something (Lonergan’s intellectual level of conscious intentionality) by careful study of his sources (Lonergan’s empirical level of conscious

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59 E.g., the motif of bringing good news associated with the LXX use of the verb εὐαγγελιζόμαι and with Luke’s preference for the use of that verb in the middle voice as found recurrent in the LXX over Matthew’s and Mark’s preference for the noun form.

60 Cf. Lonergan, Early Works in Theological Method 1, 286.

61 Luke might have had some thematized set of terms and relations for interior process since he lived in the Greek-speaking world after Aristotle and since Luke shows evidence of having had a very good education. But we will never know the extent of his reflection on interiority, for we only have two narrative texts from him and because his intent in writing them is not to present a philosophic view but to recount a story.

62 Ibid., 295, 297.
intentionality) which he thinks is really there and is important (Lonergan’s rational level of conscious intentionality in judgments of fact and of value), and he is going to convey the fruit of his study for the good of another (Lonergan’s responsible level of conscious intentionality).\textsuperscript{63} Finding discernible all four of Lonergan’s natural levels of conscious intentionality in what Luke says of himself in the prologue to the Third Gospel tells us that later developments in understanding and in perspectives can bring out what is implicit in earlier information. What is certainly evident here is that Luke is in touch with the workings of his own interior acts at a common sense realm of meaning.

Let us return to the issue of purposefulness on Luke’s part. Luke 1:1-4 is a narrative transaction not among the characters of the story but directly between the author and the reader. Hence, I would assign it as belonging to the narrative discourse, and as prologue, as belonging to a most significant context of the discourse. I stress the fact that we see Luke’s attention to matters of interiority in the discourse (transactions between the author and the reader; a matter of how he is telling the story). The presence in discourse is one indication of a motif, i.e., a tool of the conscious intentionality of an author for communicating thematic meaning or value.\textsuperscript{64} Luke 1:1-4 and its content and meaning are from Luke and not from the ensuing story as he received it. The discourse is his creation; he gave it form.

The interior process referenced in Luke 1:1-4 agrees with Lonergan’s insistence that coming to believe is a matter of faith giving light to reason and not one in which faith is aided by

\textsuperscript{63} Lonergan, \textit{Method in Theology}, 9.

\textsuperscript{64} There is a literary distinction between “motif” and “theme”. A motif is concrete; a theme is in the realm of values and meaning. Portraying concrete mental acts would be a motif; the value of understanding would be a theme. A motif usually mediates a theme. Interior acts are always concrete interior data. In this paper, my “thematizing” is what a student of a text does; I inquire about a recurrent element in the text. Making a motif carry a narrative meaning, i.e., making a concrete element thematic in a story, is the work of an author.
reason. It fits also with his five interior steps of coming to believe. Luke is using his natural intelligence (ratio) to study reports about what he and his sources believe God has done (lumen fidei). If we can say that in Luke 1:1-4 the author is aware of himself in the act of common sense theologizing, it is his natural reason that he describes as being at work and being given further light by faith. Re-reading Luke 1:1-4 in the light of Lonergan’s thought on interiority tells us that Luke paid attention to what he was doing with his own mind. As well it alerts us to look for a possible motif in his narrative, that of concrete acts of trying to understand the mystery. While what we can discern in Luke 1:1-4 about a facet of Luke’s faith process that is practical, i.e., in the common sense realm of religious meaning, the implication in verse three that he was conscious of giving his narrative an ordering (kaqexh/j) might have been a theological thematizing operation perhaps attempting to order a coherence.

As two more examples of reason illumined by faith, I will explore Luke’s portrayal of Mary and that of the bystanders.

4.2. Mary as Believer

Luke depicts in his characters the desire to understand the mystery surrounding Jesus. This goes for the sympathetic characters (who all happen to be humble worshippers at the Jerusalem temple) and for the antipathetic ones (the less than humble Scribes, Sadducees and Pharisees, also worshippers at the same temple). As believers, Luke’s characters, sympathetic or antipathetic, interpret Jesus as to whether God is or is not involved.66 In order to understand, the

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65 Lonergan, *Early Works on Theological Method* 1, 286. Lonergan is interpreting Vatican I, *Dei filius*, the section that reads *Ac ratio quidem, fide illustrata* (Chapter 4, “De Fide et Ratione”); cf. also, *Method*, 323; 335; *DS* 3016.
66 The difference between the two groups, as to their ability to accept Jesus as Messiah and prophet, Luke makes thematic; however, that is the work of another paper. None the less, it has to do with their subjectivity. Luke’s interest in interiority we see also in his making explicit in his presentation of characters what Lonergan calls intentional feeling. And that makes him describe Pharisees as “lovers of money” (Luke 16:14), and so they are also portrayed along with other negative characteristics. There are, however, rich persons in Luke-Acts who are not portrayed as lovers of money. Attitude toward material possessions is a major motif in Luke-Acts; it has an inverse proportion to one’s faith in God. For instance it is one of the operative motifs in the Story of the Prodigal Son and
humble and pious worshippers are confident enough to reason and dialogue with the heavenly agents of God’s revelation by questioning them. In addition to Mary who shows she thinks things out by questioning the divine agent, there is Zachary, Peter, Ananias and Paul. They refer revealed information to their previously, naturally acquired knowledge. Below I present the narrative information on Mary and will read it in the light of Lonergan’s normative pattern of the intentional acts at play in believing.

In Luke 1:34, Mary asks Gabriel a question, “How shall this be.” One may see this question as intending not to find out some meaning but to ascertain the reality of what is proposed. Mary’s question put to the angel is about what can be real (an sit or utrum ita sit question) and appears to have been generated by relating the content of Gabriel’s message to her present natural self-knowledge, “…I do not know man.” God’s word here from the angel and the natural inner word of Mary’s knowledge conflict; hence, there occurred a reflective act of understanding re the reality of what Gabriel proposed, and act owing to a natural cognitive process not a faith one in that moment. As a result, Mary’s question about the eventuality of what the angel affirms naturally arises. Mary’s question here is one whose principle is her intelligence, not faith. Luke has alerted us that she was already trying to understand what the angel’s greeting meant (quid sit, the question for understanding), and Luke described her state of mind as “greatly troubled” (1:29). Where does the light of faith come in? It is implicit and we can make it explicit, i.e., discern it to be operative, by referencing this passage to Lonergan’s description of the normative pattern of believing.

68 For a concise statement of the nature of the questions involved in the two operations of the intelligence, see Lonergan, Method In Theology, 335 and for the act of judgment see Early Works on Theological Method 1, 95-100.
The angel is not asking Mary. Note well! He informs her. She, servant of the Lord, is expected to assent (1:38) for she is a worshipper and a believer. And of that fact Luke leaves in his readers mind no doubt. Mary’s acquiescence to heaven’s will as an act of faith Luke makes explicit by making Elizabeth declare that Mary is blessed for Mary “believed that there would be a fulfillment of what was spoken to her from the Lord (1:45).” In fact, Luke narrates Elizabeth’s action as one of prophecy, for he recounts Elizabeth’s declaration here using his own typical language for an action of prophesying, the primary operator being always the Holy Spirit, “… Elizabeth was filled with Holy Spirit and she exclaimed with a loud cry…” (1:41-42). In the scene in Elizabeth’s house, both Mary and Elizabeth are talking of a reality that they believe is happening because of God’s willing, and they believe it because, as I am surmising according to how Lonergan has objectified the normative pattern of the process of coming to believe in reference to a supernatural object, the motive is the revelation through a heavenly agent, a very trustworthy person, not deceived and not deceiving; and, so, what the angel proposed is judged to be believable and judged to be a good for her in believing it. Mary’s words “Let it be done unto me, etc.” (1:38), show that despite her natural knowledge she chose to believe the angel and so also his message. Again here, Lonergan’s thematizing of the pattern of operations at play in a subject’s coming to believe, a pattern that is normative and transcendent, sheds light on part of

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70 Prophesying in Luke-Acts is a recurrent and an operative motif. It includes canticles, hymns and psalms (Luke 20:42; 24:44; Acts 1:20), and is introduced by language indicating that the person prophesying has been given the Holy Spirit (John the Baptist, Jesus) or is filled for the moment with Holy Spirit; cf. Luke 1:15, 67, 76; 7:26; 24:19; Acts 2:16-21; 3:22-23 (compare Acts 7:37); 4:8, 31; 9:17; 13:9; Acts 28:25. Agabus is a Christian prophet speaking for the Holy Spirit (Acts 21:10-11). Women are prophetesses; Elizabeth, Anna (Luke 2:36) and the four unmarried daughters of Philip, the deacon-evangelist, prophesy (Acts 21:8-9). Prophecy in Israel according to Luke-Acts, in the time before, during and after Jesus’ existence on earth, is the operation of the Holy Spirit as divine primary agent. Frederick E. Crowe, S. J. comments on the difference between the light of faith and prophetic light (Three Thomist Studies, Supplementary Issue of the Lonergan Workshop, vol. 16; ed. Frederick E. Crowe, S.J.; 13, as well as notes 43 and 44). I quote Fr. Crowe: “…the light of faith and the light of prophecy operate in different fields. The light of faith does not give knowledge (Aristotelian scientia) of the articles of faith; it shows us that we ought to believe what belongs to another’s knowledge. Prophetic light, on the other hand, gives knowledge of the things prophesied.” The narrative gives no information suggesting that Elizabeth acquired her information about Mary naturally, and the reader must wonder how she got it, if not by prophetic light.
the human reality implicit in Luke’s characterization of Mary. In order to have portrayed these
operations in Mary, Luke must have attended to them at least on a common sense level, i.e.,
ordered to presenting to his reader something of her spiritual, interior, subjective life.

Luke twice more recounts Mary’s interior acts of trying to understand and describes her
initial state of mind. In order to portray Mary’s interior process of intending some intelligibility
in all that is happening in the regard of her son, Luke uses a verb whose original meaning was
“to toss things together” or “to assemble” in the exterior world. In the scene in which the
shepherds make known to Mary and Joseph and to the bystanders (Luke 2:15-20) the heavenly
revelation made to them, all who heard it “marveled”, and Mary “kept all these things, pondering
them in her heart.” The RSV uses the English “pondering” to translate the Greek participial
form sumba,llousa (2:19). If we take this compound Greek word in a literalistic way by
focusing on its two root components, we see that the verb, which has many uses, means to toss or
to throw together or to put together, and so to assemble. It was used also metaphorically to
image a thinking effort which intends some understanding. If we take the literalistic sense as

71 Luke, more than the other Synoptic Evangelist, mentions the state of mind that generates questions. He uses most
frequently the verb qauma,zw. One is reminded in this regard of Lonergan who says that “prior to conceiving,
there is the act of understanding; prior to the act of understanding is the state of mind that is expressed in the
question. When it is expressed in the question, one has concepts, but the prior state of mind itself is not a set of
words or a set of concepts, it is the admiratio of which Aristotle speaks, the qauma,zein. That is the beginning of
science and philosophy…” (Early Works on Theological Method 1, 128). Lonergan might have been alluding to
passages in Aristotle like the following one in Metaphysics 1.982b, 12-16: “It is through wonder (θαυμάσαντες) that
men now begin and originally began to philosophize; wondering in the first place at obvious perplexities
(διαπορήσαντες), and then by gradual progression raising questions about the greater matters too, e.g. about the
changes of the moon and of the sun, about the stars and about the origin of the universe” (Aristotle in 23 Volumes,
Vols.17, 18, translated by Hugh Tredennick. Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press; London, William
Heinemann Ltd. 1933, 1989). Luke uses both qauma,zw and diapore,w to describe the state of mind of some
of his characters. I have accessed this material on Aristotle through the Perseus Digital Library
(http://www.perseus.tufts.edu).

72 Cf. for example Heroditus, 3.160; Plato, Crat. 412c; Lycurgus, 1.68. The use of sumba,llw to signify the act of
thinking in order to understand something is not unique to Luke. It is recurrent in the Greek of his time. Josephus in
his Antiquities of the Jews gives us a clear example of its use to mean "trying to understand". In this instance, the
verb is used for understanding a dream so that it may be interpreted. Joseph is in prison with the Pharaoh's jailed
cup-bearer and his ex-chief baker, and he interprets first the dream of the cup-bearer and then that of the chief-baker
(Gen 40). Josephus' recounting of how Joseph interpreted the dream of the chief-baker fills it out with detail not
found in LXX Gen 40:18. Josephus writes: "and he (Pharaoh's ex-chief baker) expected a prediction like to that of
providing the image for its metaphorical usage, it means to throw or to put together in the mind.73 In this derived usage, this word has been translated “to compare” or “to interpret”, understood as objectifying a thinking process by imaging it analogically to the original exterior action. Luke describes Mary’s interior efforts at understanding first as wondering (qauma, zw), then as retaining (sunthre, w) all these things and finally assembling-correlating them (sumba, llw) in her heart. In his portrayal of Mary’s desire to understand the mysteries of her son, Luke objectifies in a narrative accounting Mary’s interior cognitive process as believer and as mother, even imaging part of it by the metaphor to the exterior operation of tossing things together. He characterizes Mary as having an active intelligence as well as being a person choosing to believe. One may ask, how would Luke have known about Mary’s interior faith process? If Luke did not know Mary, his sources might have known her. But we do not know even that. One may suspect that Luke understood the faith process as having some normative acts operative in any believer, and so also in the Virgin Mother.

A third time Luke tells us that Mary has not understood some aspect of the mystery of her son. This last mention occurs in the episode in which Mary and Joseph find the boy Jesus learning in the temple.74 In this scene, Jesus’ asking Mary and Joseph “Did you not know that I

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73 Lonergan, in support of his interpretation of St. Thomas’ doctrine on the emanation of the inner word after a process of inquiry and of thinking something out, cites also St. Thomas’ work, Super Ioannem c. 1., lect. 1. Of interest here is how in Super Ioannem the Saint uses the Latin verb iacto, iactare (ba, llw, sumba, llw) to image the mental operation of intending an intelligibility: “Quamdiu ergo sic rationcinando intellectus iactatur hac atque illac.” Thomas talks of intelligence being tossed here and there while Luke appears to intend that information is tossed about by the mind as one seeks to understand. I found this citation of Thomas in Lonergan’s work, Verbum: Word and Idea in Aquinas; 22-23, note 45.

74 Luke’s motif of study and learning is a thing to be explored. It must have been important to him as a person. I cannot pursue such a study in this paper, but one will find the motif recurrent in the following passages: Luke 1:1-4; 2:41-52 (Jesus listening [avkou, w in the imperfect tense] to teachers in the Temple); 7:36-50 (a symposium
must be in my Father’s house” results in their incomprehension (Luke 2:49-50). Again, as before, Luke tells us that Mary “kept (dieth, rei) all these things in her heart” (2:51). The verb diathre,w means to watch closely, to keep faithfully; it describes a cognitive effort. With the phrase “in her heart” Luke intended to portray an interior process, and in depicting it, he objectifies in some partial way that process in using the language of images. Mary, it should be noted, is portrayed as actively working her interior operations as their subject, not unlike as we find in Luke 1:1-4, in which verses Luke presented himself as actively intelligent in relation to his faith sources.

In summary then, we know that Luke portrays Mary using the natural light of intelligence before her act of faith. And then, after her act of faith she tries to understand. Luke’s Mary reasons, assents, makes acts of faith and commits her life. What Luke’s portrayal of Mary’s believing does not mention is the reflective act of understanding. But thematizing, mine and Lonergan’s, can make explicit what is implicit. Mary’s natural desire to understand made her question the possibility of the angel’s proposal; yet in the end, she believes. What in Mary’s interior happened in between? Well, Lonergan’s normative account of the interiority of coming to believing would see here at some point operative the reflective act of understanding by which Mary had to have thought that she could and should believe heaven and actively decided to believe (Mary’s fiat [Luke 1:38] and Elizabeth’s prophecy [Luke 1:45]), and so her act of faith moved to completion, “Let it be done to me, etc” (Luke 1:38).

What was Luke doing in the way he presented Mary in his gospel narrative by telling of her intentional acts of believing, questioning and trying to understand? He has certainly re-characterized her in many ways differently from his Marcan source. Of course, we cannot
assume that Mark was his only source of information about Mary; we simply have nothing else on Mary extant, known to be prior to Luke’s account and known to be known by Luke. By relating in a recurrent way her intentional acts, Luke portrays Mary as in wonder, as questioning in order to understand, as willing to believe, i.e., as an actively intelligent person (both in the natural use of her intelligence as well as in the use of her intelligence illumined by the light of faith), and as one fully in charge of her intentional acts. The Third Evangelist in his authorial re-characterization of Mary also portrayed her interior acts using metaphorical language; he used images for those interior operations, and so in his discourse he descriptively objectified Mary’s interior. We know from Luke 1:1-4 that he objectified his own intentional acts in a common sense way by relating them to the concrete and practical process that led him to write his gospel account. Now with his re-characterization of Mary that for one relates her subjective states and acts, we have motive so far to begin thinking that Luke may be creating with his discourse a motif of interior concrete acts in order to thematize some meaning or value, perhaps theological value. I shall continue to present narrative information in this regard, but we may have a clue to what Luke was intending in his portrayal of Mary’s believing, for Luke presented her new acts of faith in response to the angel’s message as continuous with her prior faith in God. Emphasis here is on the word “continuous”.


How Luke depicts the interior acts of Mary’s coming to believe the angel would be consonant with Lonergan’s thorough explication of the normative pattern of intentional acts in

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75 Lonergan defines theology by what it does, actually by what theologians do (Method in Theology, xi). He uses in his earlier reflections on theological method the position of St. Thomas on the task of theology: “theologia tractat de Deo et de aliis quae ad Deum ordinantur” (Summa theologiae, 1, q. 1, a.7, ad 2m; quoted in Early Works on Theological Method 1, 4).
one’s believing. Luke’s authorial activity in the regard of his portrayal of Mary’s acts of faith implies that he must have done some thinking about thinking and about believing, some reflecting on intentional acts and process. Although we have no evidence that he operated at the theoretic level in his thinking about interior processes, he must have valued his understanding of believing enough to portray it in the characterization of one of his most rhetorically sympathetic characters, namely Mary.

Let me continue to apply what Lonergan held about interior processes to Luke’s characterization of Mary. Luke presents her as needing to use the light of her intelligence to understand the things God is doing in the regard of her son. Nowhere did Luke indicate that Mary received special intellectual light in her attempt to understand. Whatever in Luke’s cultural and religious world might have been the thinking on what we today call the faith and reason relation, if there had been any, by depicting Mary as a character who actively, intentionally operates her own interior acts of trying to understand what she believes God is doing, Luke showed that he must have reflected upon that interior activity and process. He saw the need to make an effort to understand what in faith was believed and to correlate that to imminently generated knowledge. Again we learn something about Luke. Namely, he thought about and appreciated the relation and contrast between knowledge held from believing and knowledge imminently generated. He might have even dramatized in Mary something of the process he experienced in himself as a believer, a process of tension between natural knowledge and revealed knowledge, a movement from old to new acts of faith in the same God, from old to new meanings, which challenged him to look for continuity.

Now as to Luke’s thematizing, the way Luke depicts the interiority of Mary’s believing is a characterization unique to his gospel account, and that portrayal recurs three times. This
repetition signals deliberate and purposive authorial action in characterizing Mary. Luke attempted here to communicate something about interior, intentional process and about Mary by dramatizing her interior operations of believing, as acts of which Mary is aware, is the initiating and the intelligent subject, is fully in charge and directing what she is doing; Luke presented her working the acts in herself attending to her experience. His authorial activity implies something about him as a believer and about what he believed a believer should do and be, namely actively and reflectively intelligent.

Did Luke gain this insight about portraying Mary from his study of his sources unknown to us? Did Luke create his Mary after an ideal of woman, an image, gained from his own love for such a woman or from knowledge of many good women he admired? Did Luke have some special reports about the mother of Jesus that other hagiographers in the New Testament did not have? Did he actually meet Mary? Whatever the actual case might have been, Luke’s intelligence, artistry and faith have presented us with a characterization of Mary, the mother of Jesus, as a woman of deep faith and active intelligence. Luke had to have given thought, had to have reflected on, what because of Lonergan we now call the subjectivity or interiority of believing. Luke’s narrative characterization of Mary as an actively intelligent believer, a questioning believer, shows that he was operating in at the very least a common sense realm, in the thematic of what we call today the issue of the relation between faith and reason or accepting revealed knowledge and going with imminently generated knowledge. He must also have appreciated the value of understanding the realities of one’s beliefs for the vibrancy of one’s faith life. “And Mary said to the angel, ”How shall this be, since I have no husband” (Luke 1:34)?

4.3. The Chorus of Bystanders as Believers
My argumentation in the exegetical and hermeneutic levels of this study must show that Luke depicted the interior acts of the characters in his narratives with authorial intent and interest, that in his recounting of a known story he thematized the matter and that the data which I am thematizing from the Lucan text are not simply owing to the nature of the story. One signal of an author’s purposive activity is a recurring element in a narrative. Tracing motifs and correlate themes ordinarily can tell us something about the author via those tendencies. And the aim of this study is to understand Luke via his narratives; his subjectivity is the object of interest. Most likely Luke’s awareness of and care to portray interior acts owe to his attending in some way to his own interior operations and values. Over and above the element of recurrence, we have examples of Luke’s redaction of the Marcan text. Needless to say, editorial activity also shows intent and purpose. Therefore, I will give another of several instances of Luke’s portrayal of acts of believing; in this case, I present information about what the Third Evangelist has the bystanders do and say and compare that with what his written source, the Marcan text, recounts of the observers. I believe that with his portrayal of the bystanders Luke shows interior development in these subjects, a process of believers in the Israelite God coming to believe also in Jesus as a function of their belief in God.

Luke makes clear that the bystanders are believers by referring to them as o` lao,j. Mark never names the bystanders as o` lao,j i.e., a technical term in the LXX for Israel as the worshipping, believing People of God. Still for Mark also, just as for Luke, o` lao,j is his Greek word for the worshipping people of Israel (Mark 7:6; 14:2). Luke applies the term also to those of Israel who accept Jesus as being of God; he does so to form an opposition to the leaders who, the same as the bystanders, are first-hand witnesses of Jesus’ deeds of power, but

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unlike the bystanders reject Jesus as prophet. We know that the bystanders in Luke’s account are believers because he depicts them worshipping in the Temple (1:10, 21), or in the synagogue (4:36; 13:17) or responding to having witnessed Jesus’ works of power by praising God (7:29; 18:43).

Luke’s bystanders witness phenomena worked by Jesus and so experience awe (4:36) or astonishment (5:26; 9:43); they in turn wonder and comment (1:21; 1:65; 2:18; 5:26) and finally form questions as to what Jesus’ works of power mean (1:66; 4:36; [quid sit questions]) and answer that it all means that God has raised up a prophet and so has visited His people for salvation (7:16). We find also in Luke’s Marcan source the quid sit question. But only in Luke do the bystanders go on to a determination by answering what it all means, for the meaning is that God has acted to save. In the end “they glorified God” (7:16). Important for understanding the particularity of the believing process that Luke portrayed is that the faith affirmation of the bystanders is essentially about God. We may have here a further indication that the purpose of Luke’s making a motif of interior acts of believing is to work the theological theme and value of continuity of faith-religion.

In Luke 7:16, the Third Evangelist shows the climax of the interior faith development in the bystanders with the Story of the Raising of the Son of the Widow of Nain, a narrative found only in his gospel. After their experiencing fear coming upon them in connection with witnessing the miracle of this story, they use their beliefs to come to what Lonergan calls a reflective act of understanding; for they determine by faith the meaning of these historical events, the meaning of which is an affirmation about what God is actually doing. Jesus operates as a great prophet, and because of the works he performs, one can and should believe that God is with him. As a result, they glorify God because they have judged Jesus’ work of power here as a
real intervention of God: “A great prophet has risen among us!” and “God has visited his people!” These words are not only an act of worship but also a confession of faith in Israel’s God. They understand what it all means in light of their religious writings. The connection with their religious scriptures and prior faith commitment is in the use of the words “God has visited his people.”

The expression “God’s visit” is a creedal expression taken out of the language of the LXX and means God’s intent and action that saves or punishes. For example, God’s will to save Israel from Egypt is expressed as His visit (Exod 3:16) and many Septuagintal references to the Exodus have the same expression, God’s visiting” (ἐπισκέπτομαι [Gen 50:24 and 25; Exod 4:31; 13:19]). Luke uses the Septuagintal ἐπισκέπτομαι several times in his double-opus to mean God’s saving action (Luke 1:68, 78; 7:16; Acts 7:23; 15:14). The continuity here with the faith language in the LXX clearly indicates Luke’s re-use of this LXX faith motif of God's visit.

What did Luke intend? I propose that with his portrayal of the movement of faith in the bystanders he continued his thematizing, even dramatizing, of the interiority of faith, of intentional faith process as he comprehended it. And he might have made it a part also of several motifs that portray continuity between Septuagintal and Jerusalem Temple religion on one hand and Christian faith movement on the other; the theological principle of continuity had to have been God as mover; hence, Luke emphasized the function of prior faith commitment. We may see in his portrayal of the bystanders a development beyond the Lucan source material in Mark, and, therefore, we may infer purposive, intentional activity in the Lucan retelling. Luke’s Marcan source for the bystanders as a group character does not let the reader know that they

77 Cf. as well for God’s visit as bringing good and salvation Gen 21:1; Jer 15:15; 34:8; 36:10; 39:37, 41; 1 Sam 2:21; Ruth 1:6; Judith 8:33; 13:20; Sirach 35:18; 46:14; 49:15; LXX Ps 8:5 (cited in Heb 2:6); LXX Ps 64:10; 105:4.
were believers and does not indicate any creedal affirmation on their part as a result of their eye-witness experiences of Jesus’ works of power, although one could argue that in Mark there may be some suggestion of faith. Luke on the other hand is explicit by referring to the bystanders as o` lao,j and by showing the actions of the bystander-witnesses as those of believers in and worshippers of the God of Israel; further, they conclude that their understanding of what they have experienced in Jesus fits with their beliefs recorded in their sacred writings. Noteworthy is that as worshippers at God’s Temple, their creedal statement is not so much about what Jesus is doing but about what God is doing in Jesus. This feature of the narrative among others suggests to me that Luke intended to portray continuity of religious faith. God is visiting his people by raising up among them a great prophet. For in 7:16 the Greek verb for the RSV “has arisen” is a theological passive, a convention in Israelite religion of the time. God is the agent; He is raising up the prophet as He promised.

Let us refer Luke’s portrayal of faith process in the bystanders to Lonergan’s normative thematizing of the interiority of believing. As Israelite believers in God and in His promises that were part of that religious tradition, the bystanders interpret what they experience in Jesus by using what today is termed the light of faith given by those Judaic beliefs and by applying them in order to understand Jesus and his deeds. They are moving from accepted beliefs to an ulterior faith affirmation in the reality of God’s actions after having discerned a meaning in Jesus’ deeds that corresponds to their beliefs in God’s promises.

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78 Luke, of course, has those sacred writings in the LXX or Greek version.
80 As to whether the light that informed the bystander’s reasoning might have been the light of faith or prophetic light, I would hesitate to say that Luke portrays it as prophetic, since one finds in the text in the regard of the bystanders no use of the Lucan formulas that introduce the occurrence of prophecy.
Again, I relate Luke to Lonergan. As a faith affirmation, a judgment about God, Luke 7:16 should have been their answer to a question for a critical act of understanding as Lonergan’s account of the interior believing process indicates. The critical question should have been asked: “Is it really God doing something here through Jesus.” Luke for the most part takes over from Mark the *quid sit* question for understanding, “What is this word? For with authority and power he commands the unclean spirits, and they come out” (Luke 4:36). I work backward in order to supply the critical *ansit* question, seeing it according to Lonergan’s analysis of believing as suggested by the nature of the words of their faith affirmation and their consequent act of worship: “They glorified God saying, ‘A great prophet has arisen among us!’ and ‘God has visited his people!’” (7:16). In other words, Jesus is of God and so he is credible and it is good for us to believe in him (credentity). I am filling out the bystander’s interior process with Lonergan’s thematizing of that process as normative, as invariant, in the pattern of its interior operations. Luke does not show all but only some of the bystanders’ interior acts. Yet implicit, because of the invariance of the pattern, are the other elements of the process. Thematizing, mine by adverting to information in the texts and Lonergan’s by his cognitive theory, can make explicit what is implicit and as a result give us also some information about Luke as an intelligent subject. What Luke depicts is consonant with the understanding of the interior process of reasoning illumined by faith: awe and wonder in eye-witness experience, questioning as to what it means, applying already held beliefs in order to understand, beliefs which correspond to traditions which we find in the LXX. And in the end, they affirm that the religious

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81 The bystanders ask this question in Luke 4:36 much the same as asked in the source Mark 1:27.
82 Compare related passages in Acts 3:18-24 (especially verse 22); 7:37, correlate passages to Luke 7:16, as to the belief in God’s promise to raise up a great prophet.
understanding is so; God is really acting. There ensues a worshipful response. It is a matter of believers progressing to a new and ulterior act of faith but one that is continuous with and given light by their inherited belief in their God. Luke depicted the bystanders’ thinking it out, coming to a determination in the light of their Israelite belief system, a process beginning with experiences that generated awe and wonder. They are actively intelligent believers. He portrayed the bystanders as believers seeking understanding and concluding by light of reason aided by the light of their faith that the God of the Temple is doing something in their time. By showing the continuity of believing in Jesus with believing in the God of the Temple in Jerusalem, the God of the Scriptures, Luke, I believe, is pursuing one more way of working his pervasive theme in his double opus of the continuity of Christian beliefs and practices with Israelite religion and faith (this interpretation belongs to a larger hypothesis about Luke-Acts).

The concern for showing the continuity of God’s action prior to and then in Jesus can be evinced by many other features of the texts. Necessary for the scope of this paper is simply to indicated the ground for the information that I present as evidence of Luke’s thematizing interiority and, most especially, the interiority of believing and of understanding what is believed. To adduce just one more item in the text of the gospel in the regard of understanding what is believed and of the continuity of beliefs new and old, I call attention to Luke 24:32: “They said to each other, ‘Did not our hearts burn within us while he talked to us on the road, while he opened to us the scriptures’.”

Again, as with Luke’s re-characterization of Mary so in the case of the bystanders, we may see Luke making the concrete acts of interior process into a narrative motif. I mean that

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83 The LXX may be seen as one of the contexts for the Lucan double opus. The Lucan texts are replete with links to the LXX by allusion, by citation, by reproduction of its linguistic patterns and its imagery, by continuation of its theological themes, by use of its genres (e.g., prayers, hymns, visions etc.), by presentation of typical scenes reminiscent of those in the LXX and by the paralleling of characters who populate the gospel to those of the LXX. His traditional religious discourse suggests a story continuous with that tradition.
portraying interior movement in his characters is recurrent, a feature of his discourse and is redactional in his re-characterization of the bystanders in his account of the gospel story; hence, Luke’s portrayal is purposive in his telling of the story and not simply a matter of the content of the story as received from his known sources. I can for reasons of the length of this paper only mention that Luke brings out in his double opus the interior process occurring also in Simon Peter as suffering believer handed over to Satan for testing by humiliation.84 As well, I will only mention here Luke’s speculation, or a Lucan source’s, on Jesus’ interior acts as he hung on the cross, a passage which I think is very significant. In Peter’s Pentecost Sermon (Acts 2:25-28), the Third Evangelist has Peter use a passage from LXX Psalm 15:8-11 (RSV 16:8-11) to tell why God raised Jesus from the dead. Luke applies these words to Jesus, and by their place in the context of his speech and by the meaning of the very words, they have to do with the workings of Jesus’ interior as he hung dying on the cross.85

Luke of course does not name and explicate terms and relations systematically as does Lonergan. His intent as author was otherwise, i.e., not methodical or philosophical. His aim is practical, to give surety to his reader. The truth of Lonergan’s objectification of interior process as self-transcending when authentic mediates a reality that is accessible in some way to anyone of any time. That reality was there in order for Luke to attend to, to understand and to value. Hence, Luke with his many sensibilities could portray appreciation of a good part of interior processes without coming to a full theoretic objectification of it with the terms and relations explicated and defined as thoroughly as Lonergan has provided. But as Lonergan says in effect,

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85 Also Heb 12:2 speaks of the joy that made Jesus able to endure the cross. This interpretation of what was transpiring inside Jesus during his passion might have been thematic in primitive Christianity.
the objectification of interiority is one thing, but the prior reality is what counts. Luke objectifies interiority in narrative rather than in system, and he does so to a remarkable extent for practical reasons of faith nourishment.86


In Luke 15:17, the Story of the Good Father and His Two Sons (special Lucan material), the evangelist portrays a turn to one’s interior to deal with a problem. Luke depicts the Prodigal Son to be experiencing himself in dire straits and so addressing his situation. I translate here in a literalistic way how Luke expresses this in the Greek: Coming (or going) into himself, he said …” 87 In vv 17-19 interior dialogue, memory, recognition of good, judgment and decision are portrayed. The Prodigal appreciates through the medium of reflection on memories that his father is a good and more than generous man, especially with food, more than generous even to his servants; hence, the reason for his decision to return home as a servant. Here is the contrast to the older son, who cannot appreciate his father’s generosity. However, the Prodigal’s decision here may be owing to what is good in him but equally to what in him is still scoundrel. For we get no more information from the author about his interiority

In Luke 15:17, the Third Evangelist portrays in the Prodigal a character turning to and operating in his interiority to deal with his situation. The contrast with the older brother lies in intentional feelings connected with attitude toward material possessions. That attitude is a major motif (feelings are concrete interior operations) and a value-disvalue theme in Luke-Acts.88 The Prodigal and the Father are not attached to material possessions; the older son is; whence, his

86 Cf. above note 8.
87 The original Greek reads: eivj e`auto.n de. evlqw.n efh. One makes note here of the Greek accusative of motion inward. Fitzmyer (The Gospel according to Luke, 1088-1089) cites several extra biblical Greek texts wherein one finds the same expression.
anger over the slaughter of the fatted calf. Luke here shows appreciation of interiority in operation and in relation to behavior. However, he leaves the story open-ended, without a conclusion; for he does not tell us whether or not the older son joins the feast as desired by the father. I believe that Luke leaves the story without resolution, and I believe that he does so in order to let the reader decide and, in this way, provide the occasion for the reader to reveal her/his own heart by the nature of the decision. The nature of the judgment of the reader will of course reflect the feelings and values in the reader. As well, Luke’s unfinished story about the sons may highlight the goodness of the father.

What might Luke have been intending in this passage? Luke might have portrayed the subjectivity of his characters to exercise the subjectivity of his readers. How their interiority is operative and oriented, including how their intentional feelings relate them to others, to things, to events etc., is a major feature of Luke’s mode of telling the gospel story received from his sources; it is an essential feature of his characterization of the story’s personae. How Luke tells this parable is as meaningful as the content, the what, of the story. Here Luke correlates a turn to interiority with a corresponding interior process and ensuing behavior. Does the evidence of Luke’s attention to the interior believing and reasoning process in himself [Luke 1:1-4] and in his characterization of the story’s personae, constitute a reason to ask whether there is some hint that he also thematized attending to one’s interior operations, attending to one’s intending, in order to objectify interior process so that as a result one might appropriate one’s own interiority for the common-sense, practical reason of having a more fruitful reception of God’s word?

5. LUKE & THE ACTIVELY INTELLIGENT AND RESPONSIBLE SUBJECT
In the previous section, I treated only a few components of the text of the Third Gospel which I think are enough to establish that Luke had a special interest in portraying human interior acts. He does so through his re-characterization of the *personae* of the gospel story which he received from his sources. His interest in human interiority tells us something about Luke, the person. In the section that follows, I present the main passages which, I believe, indicate his emphasis on the person as an attentive, intelligent, reasonable and responsible subject-operator and ultimately as responsible for one’s own interior operations.

I evinced above how Luke presents the Virgin Mother as in charge of her interior acts, as subject, as actively intelligent, as working her own interiority. Lonergan held that the act of insight or understanding grasps the nexus between elements in the phantasm, a necessary or an impossible relation.\(^8^9\) The Third Evangelist presented Mary as assembling in her heart matters involving her son; she would have been making then connections.\(^9^0\)

As to Luke’s use of the language of images for intentional operations, Lonergan in his work *Verbum*, in explicating St. Thomas’ cognitive theory, writes:

Since knowledge requires an object, and since phantasm is the object of the intellect, a phantasm is always necessary for intellectual activity, … .

In a word, one cannot understand without understanding something; and the something understood, the something whose intelligibility is actuated, is in the phantasm…. The terms to be connected are sensibly perceived; their relation, connection, unification is what insight knows in the sensitive presentation.

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\(^8^9\) Lonergan, *Understanding and Being*, 41; cf. as well *Method*, 10.

\(^9^0\) Lonergan’s continued reference to DS 3016 comes to mind here where he speaks of the interiority of believing and of the process of how reason illumined by faith could seek and come to some understanding of the revealed mysteries by making analogies to things naturally known and also by connecting (Luke’s *sumba, ilousa* predicated of Mary) together the mysteries among themselves.
It makes no difference how spiritual the object, how far removed from sense; phantasm remains necessary.91

Luke’s language for portraying Mary’s interior, unseen and so spiritual acts, namely, Mary’s keeping in her heart (sunthre,w [1:19], diathre,w [1:51]) and tossing, comparing or interpreting in her heart (sumba,llw [1:19]) all these things together in order to understand is language of images that objectify Mary’s interior, spiritual acts. These metaphors in Luke’s portrayal of Mary’s interior operations indicate the first stages of the total structure and dynamic of cognitional process as Lonergan, in updating St. Thomas’ cognitional theory, has so thoroughly schematized it. One thinks here how Lonergan calls attention to the metaphor “weigh the evidence” to speak of the reasoning process that results in a reflective act of understanding.92 Luke’s understanding of the cognitional process might have been mediated through phantasms corresponding to the metaphors he has used to portray Mary’s reasoning. Lonergan’s development of Thomas’ thought on the function of phantasm in the act of understanding gives us light by which to appreciate a facet of Luke’s relation of Mary’s intentionality.

Luke was dealing with the very reality of cognitional process in the terms he had available to him, concrete and practical terminology of a common sense thinking, a thinking that relates things to ourselves and to our endeavors. Lonergan’s observation about Augustine’s

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91 Lonergan, *Verbum: Word and Idea in Aquinas*, 38, note 124; 41-42; cf. also, Bernard Lonergan, “Insight Revisited”, in *A Second Collection*, eds. William F. J. Ryan, S. J. and Bernard J. Tyrrell, S. J., London: Darton, Longman & Todd, 1974; 267. As noted before, Luke (and other Greek authors) and Thomas imaged, although from different angles, a first part of the rational process in a way that made them use the picture of a “tossing”. This image of tossing, I might think, is at least one phantasm at play in Thomas’ insight into the relation of intellectual light to phantasm in the generation of an insight. That image seems to be there also in Luke’s milieu. One thinks here also of how teachers use images to help students understand what is going on in theoretical or mathematical physics re relativity, quantum mechanics, string theory, matters of scientific investigation which cannot be experienced directly or even detected by instruments; e.g., the use of images in the following terms: space-time “fabric”, “string” theory.

appreciation of interiority fits in well here in reference to Luke: “Though it cannot be claimed that Augustine elevated introspection into a scientific technique, it cannot be doubted that he purported to report in his literary language what his own mind knew immediately about itself.”

As we now see from the thematizing done from Newton to Einstein and now with the graviton’s of quantum mechanics, Aristotle’s and Galileo’s speculation on falling bodies is part of the history of what today is called gravitational theory. So too then the Third Evangelist’s interest in interior acts viewed from the perspective given by the work of Thomas and of Lonergan may be understood today as having reflected upon cognitional process. Appreciating Luke’s interest in interior operations may help in discovering new dimensions of meaning in his narratives.

Luke’s choice of the participle sumba, llousa (Luke 2:19) to convey Mary’s interior effort to understand is an instance of his use of language about mental acts. I propose his use of sumba, llousa in the regard of Mary’s attempt to understand as an example not only of Luke’s interest in thematizing interior acts but also of his thematizing the importance of the believing subject being actively intelligent. And this Lucan interest tells us in his literary way what his mind knew of its own workings. I will now explore more of Luke’s motif of being actively intelligent and self-appropriating.


Lonergan’s transcendental method is about heightening consciousness of one’s own rational and volitional operations and their patterns. Luke’s Jesus exhorts the subject to operate consciously and intentionally and to attend to her/his reception of the “word”. I will present Luke 10:26 and 8:18, passages that I believe clearly indicate Luke’s awareness of the importance of the subject as a responsible operator of her/his own interior process.

93 Ibid., 9.

It is difficult to say for sure whether Luke 10:25-28 has as primary source Mark 12:28-34. For there are similarities, but there are very great differences between these passages in Luke and in Mark. Of interest here is that Luke has a lawyer ask Jesus, “Teacher, what shall I do to inherit eternal life?” Jesus in turn addresses the lawyer with a question, “What is written in the law? How \((\text{pw/j})\) do you read”? The lawyer responds with a conflation of Deut 6:5 and Lev 19:18 as the two great commandments. Luke presents Jesus not as asking “What do you read”. By having asked the question “How do you read” we can see focus thrown on the subject’s act (on the subject actively, intelligently and responsibly operating) as opposed to focus centering on the content of the written object.

5.1.2. Luke 8:18: “Take heed then how \((\text{pw/j})\) you listen.”

Luke 8:18 is one of the imperative “pay attention” passages. This verse belongs to a linked sequence of passages, the immediate context of which is the Parable of the Sower and its explanation (Luke 8:4-15). Luke has established so far that Jesus is God’s prophet, God’s visitation. He has presented a series of passages that dramatize Jesus’ preaching the word and his healing the afflicted, passages that also contrast some people’s reactions of faith in Jesus as prophet against some other’s inability or refusal to see Jesus as a prophet from God.


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95 Cf. also Mark 10:17 and Luke 18:18, passages in which someone asks of Jesus the same question.

ou=n pw/j avkou, ete). The change here is almost certainly redactional on Luke’s part and, when placed in correlation to Luke 10:26, we may take it as indicating an authorial intent to highlight the subject as operator of her/his interior acts and so responsible for them. In Luke 8:18, the Third Evangelist has Jesus tell his listeners to attend to their intending of the word, to appropriate their operation of listening and receiving the word.

The Greek avkou, ete translates here best as “listen” and not as “hear”, for the operation is active, attentive and intelligent and not merely empirical; we see a comparable use of the verb avkou,w in the story of Jesus as a boy of twelve listening in the temple to the teachers (Luke 2:46). Joseph Fitzmyer translates this passage in this way and explains that Luke emphasizes the “mode of listening rather than its object”. He sees the change as “an important modification of the Marcan source” for Luke connects this passage with the modes of listening spoken of in the explanation of the Parable of the Sower (8:12, 13, 14, 15). In Lonergan’s terms, in the relation of Luke 8:18 to Luke 8:11-15, the evangelist has Jesus tell his listeners to attend to and so, implicitly from the perspective of Lonergan’s analysis of subjectivity, move on to objectify their acts of listening in order to know the heart receiving the word, because the receiving heart (subject) is expected to bear fruit (Luke 8:16-17). The thrust of the passage, as I see it, says that not only is the subject responsible for the act of listening, the subject must attend to the self as the receiving ground in order to know what kind of ground the subject is so that in turn the word received may bear fruit, may give light or lose what it has.

Interpreting exactly what the Third Evangelist intended to convey by his juxtaposition and sequencing of the passages that compose Luke 8:4-21 is difficult. I think that the one unifying

99 Ibid.
factor in these verses is the highlighting of the believing subject, a recurrent element so far in the Third Gospel as I have shown. In verse 8:18 Luke put focus on the subject’s mode of the listening. He does not speak of objectification of the self. From the perspective of Lonergans’s teaching on transcendental method, can we supply here that Luke might have had some idea of self-objectification aimed at knowledge of the self for the common sense, practical aim of some form of religious or personal or spiritual benefit? Lonergan speaks of transcendental method as “a matter of heightening one’s consciousness by objectifying it and that is something that each one, ultimately, has to do in himself and for himself.”

The Lucan narrative has prepared the reader by depicting Mary to be an exemplar of this intentional operation of listening to the word, receiving it existentially and bearing fruit. After making Jesus tell his disciples, “Pay attention to how you listen (8:18),” Luke in the very next verse (Luke 8:19) presents Mary, Jesus’ mother, wishing to see Jesus. When the crowd tells him that his mother is there, Jesus says that his mother etc., are the ones who listen to the word and do it (Luke 8:19-21). In Luke’s characterization of Mary, this is precisely what she has so far done, and Elizabeth makes in this regard a prophetic interpretation: “And blessed is she who believed that there would be a fulfillment of what was spoken to her from the Lord” (1:45).

Mary has done what those spoken of as the ideal listener of the word are to do (Luke 8:15), for she has the heart that listens and holds the word (Luke 1:38, 45; 2:19), and bears fruit with endurance (2:34-35, 48-51). According to verses 8:12, 13, and 14, those who listen to the word do not in turn hold it fast in a beautiful (noble) and good heart (8:15). The listeners referred to in these verses have some defect in their hearts, in them as subjects. The contrast with the

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100 Lonergan, Method, 14.
102 Of the expression in Luke 8:15, a beautiful and good heart (ἐνν καρδι, α| καλή| καὶ ἀγαθή) I will treat more in depth in another paper. The phrase, “beautiful and good”, according to Fitzmyer’s research is recurrent in Jewish literature of the Greek-speaking Diaspora (The Gospel according to Luke, 714).
listeners in verse 18 is precisely about the “beautiful and good heart”. The subject that receives the word is a principle of fruitfulness or its lack. Listeners of the word (disciples) must know the quality of their hearts. These passages that follow the Parable of the Sower have the import of recommending a self-appropriation for spiritual fruitfulness.103

Lonergan remarked that “in a sense everyone knows and observes transcendental method”; i.e., one’s being “attentive, intelligent, reasonable, responsible,” one’s “heightening one’s consciousness by objectifying it.”104 In these passages about receiving the word of God in the heart, Luke as redactor of Mark is telling people through his characterization of Jesus to attend to their conscious and intentional act of listening to the word as the act of receiving it in their hearts. They are to attend to their intending or receiving the word of God, for by not attending they cannot take charge of the process and so might lose in the end what they thought they had (8:18).105 To me, these words in Luke 8:18 are a practical way for a believer to enhance her believing by what Lonergan calls “applying the operations as intentional to the operations as conscious.”106 If they attend to their interior acts, to themselves as subjects who are operating, they will be given more. How? Luke assumes his reader knows the answer, for he does not explain. Lonergan, though, may have the answer. He observes that this same heightening of consciousness that reveals the subject as subject does proceed:

“to an objectification of the subject…to a transition from the subject as subject to the subject as object. Such transition yields objective knowledge of the subject just as

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103 As to how one may reconcile in Lonergan’s philosophy the religious scope of spiritual fruitfulness which is in the dramatic-practical pattern of experience with the self-appropriation of the intellectual pattern of experience, see note 22 above.
104 Lonergan, Method, 14.
105 The postpositive conjunction ga. r in the second clause of Luke 8:18 certainly is explanatory of the imperative “Pay attention to how you listen”.
106 Lonergan, Method, 14.
much as does any valid transition from the data of sense through inquiry and understanding, reflection and judgment.”

And so by understanding the self in the act of receiving the word one can take the responsibility for enhancing one’s resonation with the word and for countering the fear of suffering on account of the word. The endurance in bearing the suffering that comes with holding to the word owes, Luke was suggesting I suppose, to a beautiful and good heart (8:15), and so from that heart will come forth fruit. For the reception of the word according to the explanation of the parable must go on to produce fruit by enduring suffering or testing. Luke here presupposes that his readers know and share in a belief pattern pervasive in the LXX on testing and enduring. And the inner workings or process of listening to the word is that the subject-operator lights a lamp in the self by how the act of receiving the word is worked. That lighting a lamp in the self creates in the self the powers of giving light to others which service is necessary for keeping the light in the self. It is not just God’s action that lights the lamp in the listener. According to the Greek of this passage, i.e., the use of verbs in the active which have an indefinite human subject, the responding self as subject-operator has something to do with the lighting of the lamp in the self. Just as another’s presence to oneself calls for a response to that presence, either a negative or a positive response, so too self-presence proceeding to self-objectification invites a response to the self. Luke may have well appreciated the relation between presence and responsibility, i.e., the ability to respond to presence negatively or positively. That beautiful and good heart obtains by

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107 Ibid., 262.
108 The motifs of testing (peirasma, j) and enduring (u`pomonh,) and their thematic and religious value in Luke-Acts is a literary motif and theological thematic thoroughly continuous with that of the LXX. In the Septuagintal mind, which Luke shares, suffering is testing and testing is suffering. That God tests hearts is a pervasive motif in the LXX and in Luke-Acts, as well as in other New Testament authors.
109 Luke 11:33-36, about the eye as the lamp of the body and light in the self, contains one of the pay attention imperatives so often found in Luke (verse 35). Again we see here the subject made responsible for interior operations, for the subject is the controller of the light in the self.
responding to the good in the self objectified by presence to the self as well as to the good outside the self.

As to the different responses of people to the same thing depicted in the above passages as well as in this story of the Woman with the Ointment, the treatment of which follows immediately, the intelligence that might have moved Luke in the composition of these passages might have been not unlike the experience, understanding, conceiving and reflection that engendered Lonergan to observe:

The data are acknowledged but explained differently. The different explanations are a function of existential orientation.

Dialectical analysis moves from the opposition between actors and authors to its root, its cause, in any actor or author. … It (dialectical opposition) arises because “whatever is received is received according to the mode of the one receiving.” But this generic solution is useless until specifically, and in the individual cases, the modes of receiving are known and judged.110

It is not unthinkable that Luke might have had some grasp of what Lonergan refers to here as “the function of existential orientation,” in one’s receiving information and so sees attending to the self in order to come to know the self, so that the knowledge can be a potential control factor.


One of the literary techniques by which Luke highlights the person as subject experiencing, attending, understanding, thinking, responding, or as not attending, not understanding, not reflecting and not responding is to parallel two characters and compare or contrast them as to what they say, think or do. In doing so, Luke reveals their subjectivity and the need to take responsibility for it. Luke has great interest in the “heart” of his characters; i.e.,

110 Lonergan, Early Works on Method 3, 28.
what I believe corresponds roughly to Lonergan’s subject-operator. Of the heart in Luke-Acts, I hope to treat in another paper. For now, I will present a reading of Luke 7:36-50, his version of the story of the woman who anoints Jesus; I will study it with a view to the suggestions of interior realities at play in the characters, which interiority underlies the exteriority narrated in the episode. I present it as a study of one example of Luke’s comparing and contrasting characters to dramatize them as subject-operators.

In this passage, Luke sets the woman’s understanding of Jesus against that of the Pharisee’s and contrasts Jesus’ characterization of the woman to that of the Pharisee. This story is found in all four gospels; however, in Mark (14:3-9) and in Matthew (26:6-13) as well as in John (12:1-8), it is related time wise and content wise to Jesus’ burial as a foreshadowing. But in Luke there is no suggestion in its content or in its place within his narrative of a relation to Jesus burial. The historical-critical positions of New Testament scholarship on the source or sources of this passage in Luke are complex and inconclusive in my opinion; suffice it to say that what we find here in Luke is from some source or sources (certainly from Mark as one source) and he redacted things to suit his purposes.

In the sequence of episodes of which Luke 7:36-50 is a part, Luke firmly establishes that Jesus is God’s prophet and that faith is necessary in order to see it.111 The immediately previous passage is a saying about the refusal to believe (Luke 7:31-35). The Pharisee Simon does not see Jesus as a prophet. Simon’s present unreal conditional, “If this man were a prophet” (verse 39), shows that he has so far failed to accept that Jesus is a prophet.112 Again, Luke’s juxtaposition of

111 Luke 7:1-10, the centurion’s faith; 7:11-17, especially verse 17 “A great prophet has arisen among us!” and “God has visited his people!” (cross-reference here Acts 3:19-26, especially verse 22); 7:18-30, the messengers of John the Baptist ask re Jesus as prophet; 7:31-35, the refusal to believe; 7:36-50, the passage under discussion; 8:1-3, the women believers who financially support Jesus and the Twelve; 8:4-21, the parable of the seed, its explanation and Jesus’ mother who listens to the word.

these passages 7:31-35 about refusal to accept God’s prophets and this one under discussion, 7:36-50, suggests that believing or refusal to believe involves a person’s subjectivity. In contrast, the woman’s physical affection for Jesus which reveals her esteem for him and the fact that Jesus and she had met each other before this episode, an encounter in which her sins were forgiven, indicate that she has accepted Jesus as prophet, just as all the other women in the series of passages from 7:1 to 8:21. There is a contrast also between the woman’s regard for Jesus signaled in how she treats his body and the Pharisee’s lack of regard implied in his failure to care for Jesus’ physical comfort. Luke contrasts also Simon’s opinion of the woman that she is a sinner (v 39) and Jesus’ judgment that she loves deeply.

The parable of the two debtors is about being a pardoned debtor (sinner) and loving in turn the merciful and forgiving creditor. Simon admits that mercy can occasion a loving response in the one forgiven (vv. 42-43). The woman’s outpouring of love, seen in her physical affection toward Jesus, is a response to her having previously been forgiven.

In the scene in which Jesus confronts Simon with the explanation as to why he has told the Pharisee the parable, for parables hold meaning precisely for the listener, Jesus speaks to Simon but looks all the time at the woman and not directly at Simon. He invites Simon also to look at the woman (v 44). Jesus asks Simon “Do you see this woman?” Then he contrasts how the two have related to him, i.e., to Jesus, and Jesus’ words challenge Simon to pay attention to

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113 Luke has a penchant for filling out detail in a scene taken from his sources. Cadbury makes note of this Lucan trait in comparing Luke’s treatment of sources with that of Josephus’ treatment of his sources, “Both editors supply details which make the scene more intelligible or striking or which are obvious inferences…”; cf. Cadbury, The Making of Luke-Acts, 175. In Luke 7:48 we find in the Greek a perfect passive indicative verb which is not a stative but true perfect passive and, although it sounds awkward in English, it means, “Your sins have been and remain forgiven.” It should not be translated “Your sins are forgiven”; pace Fitzmyer, (The Gospel according to Luke, 692). Prior to her irruption into the symposium dinner, the woman’s sins were forgiven, most likely by Jesus himself, a fact not told but implied by vv 48-49. The sinful woman’s lavish affection given to Jesus is her way of honoring and thanking him. This interpretation takes account of the meaning of the parable (vv 40-43). Cf. Plummer, 213-214.

114 In Luke 7:37 the narrator is the first to tell the reader that the woman is a sinner.
how he sees the woman and to how he regards Jesus. It is about how Simon looks and then understands, conceives, judges and responds. They are both looking at the same time at the same woman; and the woman and Simon interact with the same Jesus. But she and Simon see Jesus differently. Jesus and Simon see the woman differently. The difference owes not to what is before the eyes but what goes on behind the eyes. Simon like the woman is a debtor, and that is why Jesus’ tells the parable, but Simon does not appropriate his interior state as did the woman her interior state. Jesus, however, suggests that the difference is in Simon, for Jesus as prophet looked into Simon’s interiority (vv 39-41) and lays it open, just as Jesus, as prophet, has looked into the woman’s interior. Jesus is inviting Simon to appropriate his own sinfulness and his own opinion and judgment of the woman and even of Jesus, and suggests that Simon needs to transcend the self that formed those opinions by appropriating his sinfulness and so by becoming one who can love more: “…but he who is forgiven little, loves little” (7:47). Again, Luke ends this story resolving nothing for the reader about Simon’s final state. Does Simon take Jesus’ mild rebuke seriously or does he not? Let the reader decide and so reveal the reader’s interior.

In summary then, we see in Luke 10:26 a focus directed at the subject’s understanding or interpreting; the author calls attention to the act of the reader as opposed to the content of Scriptures, i.e., the object that is to be read or understood is only one thing; crucial is the subject who is also a principle for the configuration of the meaning proffered.

In Luke 8:18 the author presents Jesus telling his listeners in the story, and so rhetorically telling the reader through the narrative’s discourse, to attend to their intending as listeners to and receivers of the word, to become aware of the self as operating subject in order to know how one operates as one intends the object. In other words, Jesus is presented as admonishing his disciples to apply to the conscious operation of listening to the word of God an intentional
operation, i.e., to experience one’s listening to God’s word, to understand one’s listening to the God’s word, to judge one’s listening to God’s word and to decide what one must do to bear the fruit worthy of listening to God’s word.¹¹⁵ Lonergan called this a heightening of presence to the self, a heightening of consciousness of the subject as subject. Such heightening of consciousness can mediate the objectifying of interior operations, and that objectification, in turn, provides the information for understanding the self as subject, for understanding the root of the modes of receiving. For Luke 8:11-18 suggest that some element operative in the subject will make her/his reception of the word bear fruit or lose what has been received. Finding out the truth of that mode of receiving in the subject can occasion the decision to alter what must be altered in order to bear fruit.

In Luke 7:36-50, one may see an authorial presentation of a dynamic interaction between Jesus and Simon, the Pharisee, in which Jesus tries to get his host to appropriate his own subjectivity by contrasting Simon’s exterior actions to those of the woman and by interpreting the meaning of those exterior actions in light of the corresponding interior acts of little love and of great love.

For Lonergan, “self-appropriation of itself is a grasp of transcendental method” and “the appropriation of one’s own interiority, one’s subjectivity, one’s operations, their structures, their norms, their potentialities… is a heightening of intentional consciousness, an attending not merely to objects but also to the intending subject and his acts”.¹¹⁶ Luke’s calling attention to the operations of the subject and to the responsibility of the subject for her/his own subjectivity has at least in kernel some idea of transcendental method of one’s interiority and to that extent

¹¹⁶ Ibid., Method, 83.
some notion of transcendental method. As Lonergan has observed, interiority is subjectivity as illustrated by the spiritual life.\textsuperscript{117}

6. CONCLUSIONS

6.1. What am I doing in this study?

I thematize Luke’s thinking on mental acts, especially his portrayal of the cognitive operations involved in the subjectivity of believing. I propose the thesis: Luke had a common sense, a practical understanding of human interior acts even to the level of exhorting his reader in the regard of their cognitive operations of receiving and then believing the word to attend to the very operation itself as what a responsible subject must do. I present Luke here as doing what later Lonergan counsels in his account of subjectivity as the operation of self-appropriation. He has Jesus exhort his disciples to pay attention to the inner experience of listening to the word, because the receiver of the word by the nature of the self as receiver-subject will or will not produce fruit. In fine, I use the Lucan narratives to discern information about Luke, the subject-person, about his thinking on mental acts, about his individuality in this area.

6.2. How do I substantiate my thesis?

I pick out, wonder about and question Luke’s narration of the mental acts of \textit{personae} in his retelling (his discoursing) of the story he had received from sources, certainly a version from Mark, a source known to us. I show that Luke has thematized mental acts as a feature of his re-characterization of the gospel story \textit{personae}, and I do so by evincing the recurrent and redactional mention of subjective acts found clearly as features of Luke’s narrative discourse, i.e., how he is telling the gospel story. Luke, as author, thematizes by making mental, interior acts into a motif, i.e., into a concrete recurring feature of telling the story, in order to play a

\textsuperscript{117} Lonergan, \textit{Early Works on Method 1}, 287.
theme, an element of the narrative at the level of meaning and value. I use the notion of thematizing in two ways. In the first sense, thematizing is what an author does to create and to convey meaning and value through narrative elements; in the second sense, thematizing is what a student does in selecting and gathering information or data to learn about something recurrent.

In order to gauge the level of Luke’s appreciation of interior operations, I compare Luke to Bernard Lonergan’s philosophic thematization of interior acts and to two of his four realms of meaning, i.e., the realm of common sense and that of interiority. I have adhered to the first three of Lonergan’s functional specialties in his theological method; namely, research (selecting, gathering and assembling data), interpretation (suggesting some meaning to what Luke was doing as an author retelling a known story), history (comparing Luke’s portrayal of mental acts to Lonergan’s work on interiority or subjectivity).\(^\text{118}\)

6.3. What do I think I have learned about Luke?

I can link Luke in his thinking about thinking to Augustine, Pascal etc., within the Christian tradition, for he as they had a common sense appreciation of the operations of the human subject. Luke portrays attention to interior operations, to trying to understand in believing, to intentional feelings and states such as puzzlement, wonder and awe, to subjects taking responsibility for how they read and how they listen. Here is where I see that Luke

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\(^{118}\) Lonergan (Early Works on Theological Method I, 344) speculates on the first and practical thematization of truth in the sources of revelation by primitive Christians contained implicitly in the evangelizing process. He enlarges specifically on the use in the New Testament of the motifs of \(\text{lo,goj,dida,skw}\) and \(\text{avkou,w}\). In the light of Lonergan’s remarks here, one is led to speculate whether there might have been implicit among primitive Christians and reflected in their writings and so accessible to us through those writings a notion of a relation of affinity between the nature of the mysteries and their reception in human interiority. In turn then, one could discern in the New Testament incipient notions of interiority as we know it today from the perspective of Lonergan’s work (cf. note 22 above for the function of perfect charity in the range of one’s horizon). For there is not only awareness in the New Testament of didactic and sacramental mediations of the mysteries, there seems to be operative also some notion of the subjectivity or interiority that would be an adequate correlate. This would be not unlike thematizing the implicit sacramentality in the form that Israelite religion had taken, a sacramentality inherited by Christians, and its notions of God’s relation to Israel that has remained largely unthematized. One senses in reading the Bible that its authors had a refined sense of interior operations, although not a philosophically thematized one.
promoted in his re-characterization of the gospel *personae* an active intelligence, i.e., wanting and trying to understand what was to be believed by wondering and asking questions and turning thing over in one’s mind. He used descriptive language for mental operations (Luke 1:3; 2:19; 24:32) and saw some practical relation among the operations (Luke 8:18). Luke was in touch with and paid attention to his own mind, and no doubt, got from experience of and reflection on his own mind most of his notions about the mental acts which he portrayed in his characters.

Luke as Augustine had introspective sophistication and was able to appreciate the experience of the inner self without having thematized interior operation by having systematically related them one to the other in explanatory fashion using technical (precisely defined) terms. We cannot say that Luke’s introspection brought him to form a “reflectively elaborated technique ... a proper method for psychology” as Lonergan has done.\(^{119}\) None the less, Luke was able to look into cognitive processes and see that one discovers the intending subject (Luke 8:18); he was able to relate revealed knowledge to imminently generated knowledge, to turn into a literary motif the need for concrete mental effort to understand revealed knowledge and to emphasize the importance of understanding revealed knowledge. In order to portray the inner workings of his characters, Luke had to have attended to his experience of his inner self. I believe that he put down in literary language, in narrative fashion, what his mind knew about itself.\(^{120}\)

As to the reason for Luke’s thematizing of mental acts, I suggest in a preliminary way that he inculcated mental acts of believing as a motif in his discourse in order to play out a theme of continuity of religion. His portrayal of other interior acts would have been per force of his horizon. I say in a preliminary way because the research, exegetical and hermeneutic work of

\(^{120}\) Ibid., 9.
this paper would be an argument in a broader study on the portrayal of continuity of religion in Luke-Acts, and I would link his portrayal of the interior acts of believing among other things to his Septuagintizing discourse, to his making God not Jesus his main actant, to his giving Jesus a presence in the temple of Jerusalem at every phase of his existence, including his post-ascension existence (Acts 22).

6.4. Why do I want to learn about Luke, the person?

Understanding Luke, the person, can provide an ulterior heuristic principle for interpreting his narratives. I elaborate on this view in the following appendix where I relate Lonergan on exegesis to H. J. Cadbury on exegesis. There is in the Gospel of Luke and in the Acts of the Apostles more to investigate about the Third Evangelist’s interest in interiority, much more. For instance, to be explored is Luke’s making explicit the intentional feelings of his characters, including the feelings he attributes to God.

6.5. Is there any immediate fruit as a result of this study?

Right off, I may suggest at least one passage where Luke’s turn to the intellectually active subject corroborates translating a text just the way the Greek reads. In the Revised Standard Version, Luke 10:26 reads, “He (Jesus) said to him, "What is written in the law? How do you read?" This translation renders the Greek exactly (o` de. ei=pen pro.j auvto,n( VEn tw/| no,mw| ti, ge,graptaiÈ pw/j avnaginw,skeijÈ).

The Greek interrogative adverb pw/j is translated by its English equivalent “how”. In contrast and despite the lack of text-critical problems re this verse, the New Revised Standard Version and the God’s Word to the Nations Version translate pw/j with the interrogative neuter pronoun “what”, thereby, shifting the focus away from the act of the subject who reads to the content that is read. The New American Standard Version seems to make the
reader quite passive as if the marks on the page do all the work. I cite here the three versions:

**New Revised Standard Version:**
He said to him, "What is written in the law? What do you read there?"

**God's Word to the Nations:**
Jesus answered him, "What is written in Moses' Teachings? What do you read there?"

**New American Standard Version:**
And He said to him, "What is written in the Law? How does it read to you?"

The clarity of the Greek of Luke 10:26 and the Third Evangelist’s focus on the operations of the subject should put an end to such translations.

7. **APPENDIX: LONERGAN & CADBURY**

Why want knowledge about any author? It can, but not necessarily, be important for understanding what she intended to communicate. One may get such knowledge by thematizing what the author was doing in composing what she wrote, in creating her discourse in telling the story. One looks for what is particular, individual but recurrent in order to establish her interests and concerns. After having established those individual interests, one may get some understanding of the author. For instance, particular but recurring in Luke-Acts are matters of hospitality and lodging.\(^{121}\)

I located Luke in a history of thinking on interiority by comparing his thinking on thinking to that of Lonergan’s. In order to do that, I had to gain some understanding of Luke, the subject-person, by focusing on the level of his sophistication in the regard of thinking on the data of consciousness. I accomplished this task by isolating this feature of his individuality as an evangelist by means of thematizing an element of his narrative discourse, namely, his interest in

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portraying mental acts in his re-characterization of the *persona* of the gospel story. In seeking an understanding of Luke as a subject, as an individual, I pursued as a value the insights of both Lonergan and of Henry J. Cadbury. Understanding the author, according to Lonergan, is a component in understanding the text, which is a basic exegetical operation.

As to the basic exegetical operations, Lonergan lists understanding the text as the first, and he goes on to elaborate four main aspects of that first basic operation. Here, I am concerned with the third aspect, namely, “understanding the author himself, his nation, language, time, culture, way of life and cast of mind.” To understand the author is a matter of comprehending the author’s common sense, “of understanding what he would say and what he would do in any of the situations that commonly arose in his place or time.” Back in 1927, H.J. Cadbury had already done work akin to this in his book, *The Making of Luke-Acts*. He treated of the personality of the author through a process of isolating Luke’s individuality. Cadbury remarked that an author shares his general language, method and viewpoint with others of his group; still there remains “something distinctive in his writings.” Cadbury goes on to say that Luke’s “own personality” is “one of the determining factors in the making of Luke-Acts.” Most important for this study is Cadbury’s observation that “the only clue to this influence is the resultant character of the work itself and the author’s unconscious self-revelation there.” For instance, what does it say about Luke that the first four verses of his gospel (the prologue) constitute the most perfect classical Greek period in the New Testament, but in verse

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122 Lonergan, Method, 155-173.
123 Ibid., 160.
124 Ibid., 161.
125 Cadbury, *The Making Of Luke-Acts*, 213-296. In this regard, Lonergan (*Early Works on Theological Method I*, 22) observes “One forms an idea of the writer and of his tendencies simply by indicating in a general way the type of operations and combinations of operations that can be expected of him.”
127 Ibid.
128 Ibid.
five and the following verses he shifts to Septuagintized Greek as the narrative portion opens in the temple in Jerusalem? Thematizing what the author does in her discourse, whether it be continuous with her group or it be particular to her, can help us understand the author and in turn, as Lonergan and as Cadbury held, better understand the work.

Let me return to the question of gaining from an ancient text information about the individuality of its author. I shall use as an example Dante’s famous observation about Luke as an evangelist. He named Luke the \textit{scriba mansuetudinis Christi}. In Dante’s characterization here of Luke, we see that Dante has individuated an element of how Luke characterizes Jesus; he tells what Luke was doing as an author. Whether or not Luke’s discourse in this regard was owing to a conscious, intentional, authorial aim would not have been and need not have been a controlling factor in Dante’s judgment about Luke as a writer. The data in the text simply indicate something about what the author is doing and therefore also imply something about the author. Dante’s observation is an historical insight with implication about Luke, for as a literary person and a Christian, Dante could not have been unaware of the characterization of Jesus in other gospels, especially of Mark’s characterization of the person of Jesus, which at times depicts Jesus being harsh. Dante’s remark on Luke’s treatment of Jesus strongly suggests that it is the result of a comparison of evangelists.\footnote{Cadbury’s catalogue of the changes Luke made to his sources in the regard of the person of Jesus would support Dante’s insight; Cadbury (\textit{The Style and Literary Method of Luke}, 90-96) lists many omissions by Luke of material in the Marcan text that show a harshness in Jesus; e.g., the teaching on self mutilation of Mark 9:43-48; Jesus’ cursing the fig tree in Mark 11:12-14 and 20-22; the omission of the word “sternly” of Mark 1:43 (parallel Luke 5:14); the omission of “with anger” in Mark 3:5 (parallel Luke 6:10). These are only a few examples. A fruitful study would be to see by what additions to the received story does Luke portray a meekness in Jesus.} I would suggest that Dante as Cadbury must have thematized information about Jesus as he put it together from the Lucan texts as well as compared Luke’s characterization of Jesus’ to at least that of Mark. Of course behind the person as a writer is the same person as a thinker. Dante’s is not a comment about the texts of Luke but
about the author. Dante individuated a feature of Luke’s authorial activity, and as a consequence has provided another clue to Luke’s thinking, sensibilities and values and so to Luke’s individuality.130

In order to understand what I mean by placing Luke in a history of thinking which thematizes some element, we may use an analogy for my project of comparing the thinking about thinking of persons from different times and places. The analogue is how historians of science may see the thinking of Aristotle and Galileo. While Aristotle and Galileo understood that they were thinking about falling bodies, after Newton and Einstein, the subject matter has been expanded, and one may see that Aristotle and Galileo were operating in the area of what is now called gravitational theory. Thinking about falling bodies and gravitation is a thematizing of an experience; in turn, this thinking can itself be thematized by comparing those who write about it.131 The pay-off to this historical activity may be the discernment of a development in thought. The individuation of that development may in turn give a better understanding of the object of thought. As well for Catholic theologians, given the development of doctrine in the transitions from one culture to another, from one epoch to another and from one pattern of experience to another, there is at play the need to evince either the continuity of transition and development with the sources of revelation or make clear the lack of continuity.132

My aim in the above study, as I have already said, is to gain some understanding of Luke, the subject-person, by isolating a feature of his individuality as an evangelist. Such features one

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130 As to the literary distinction between the implied author and the real one in the case of the person who wrote the Third Gospel, I am content to identify the implied author (the self which the real author presents to the reader through the text, and whose character we can construct from the values, the attitudes and the hopes that the narrative embodies) with the real author (the person who historically wrote the text). I know of no evidence from the text itself sufficient to warrant the relevance of that distinction in the regard of the Third Evangelist. And as to reliable information about the real identity of the Third Evangelist, we have only his two narratives from which to mine information indirectly by analysis of his discourse in recounting a story from a prior text.

131 Lonergan (Early Works on Theological Method 1, 157) observes that “Experiment is a thematized experience.”

132 Lonergan, Method, 351-353.
may discern from what he thematizes in his narrative discourse. The above study individuates and explores his interest in portraying his characters’ interior acts.

I see value in Lonergan’s position that “to understand the author,” to understand “his nation, language, time, culture, way of life and cast of mind” is a step in understanding the text, which in turn is the aim of any exegetical operation.\(^\text{133}\) Lonergan observes:

We can remark that a phrase or an action is “just like you.” By that we mean that the phrase or action fits in with the way we understand your way of understanding and going about things. But just as we can come to an understanding of our fellows’ understanding, a commonsense grasp of the ways in which we understand not with them but them, so the same process can be pushed to a far fuller development, and then the self-correcting process of learning will bring us to an understanding of the common sense of another place, time, culture, and cast of mind. This is, however, the enormous labor of becoming a scholar.\(^\text{134}\)

In a similar line of thought, H. J. Cadbury listed four factors in the composition of a text: one, materials accessible to an author; two, conventional media of thought and expression; three, the author’s individuality; and four, the author’s conscious purpose.\(^\text{135}\) I have focused here on the third factor, the author’s individuality, for I believe that Cadbury’s observations as to the individuality of an author dovetail with Lonergan’s idea of understanding the author. I have not been able, but nor did I want, to avoid giving some attention to the other factors listed by Cadbury. The method I used was to trace some aspect of Luke’s individuality by thematizing data as evidence of that tendency operative in the text. In specific, I explored in this study textual information which I believe indicates Luke’s interest in portraying subjectivity in its

\(^{133}\) Ibid., 160.

\(^{134}\) Ibid.

workings in the *persona* of the narrative, in particular, what Lonergan calls the interiority of believing. My criteria for an individual tendency of Luke were factors in the text that were recurrent, that clearly could be isolated as a matter of the author’s discourse or that were phenomena owing to redaction of sources. I used Lonergan’s systematic account of human subjectivity or interiority as a canon for comparison so as to have a point of reference by which to talk about Luke’s depiction of the interior workings of his characters. Necessary was that I establish that the data on interiority were the intentional contribution of the Third Evangelist and that such information was not part of the received story.